6 MENTAL PHENOMENA IN ACEPHALOUS ANIMALS. 



1. Definite purpose or design, end or aim ; purposive 

 action, adaptive or adapted movements, adaptation of means 

 to ends ; actions directed to the well-being of the individual, 

 including self-preservation and self-defence. 



2. Variety of action with variety of circumstance. 



3. Spontaneity of action. 



4. Choice. 



5. Repetition of effort, involving experiment or trial, and 

 ultimate success or failure. 



6. Avoidance of obstacles. 



7. Perception. 



3. Co-ordination. 



9. Pleasure, pain, and certain of their modes of expres- 

 sion. 



By almost common consent of physiologists these pheno- 

 mena, when exhibited in brainless animals, are assigned to 

 the category of what are variously called reflex, automatic, 

 mechanical, excito-motor, or sensori- motor actions, which are 

 supposed to be independent of, or unassociated with, intelli- 

 gence, memory, reason, sensation, consciousness, and will ; 

 but it appears to me that this assignation has been alto- 

 gether, or at least too much, determined by the fact that the 

 brain is absent, and that consciousness and volition are 

 supposed to depend upon the existence of a brain. On the 

 contrary, I hold that both consciousness and volition, in 

 some form or degree, are exhibited not only by animals de- 

 prived or destitute of brain, but even of a nervous system, 

 as well as by certain plants, as I have elsewhere shown. 

 Unless we make this concession adopt this view of the 

 comprehensive character of consciousness and will it is 

 obvious that mental philosophers must so re-define these 

 terms as to restrict their application to animals provided 

 with a brain and spinal cord ; and any such re-definition 

 will probably be difficult, mischievous, and unscientific. 



Lewes and Carpenter at least appear to support the view 

 that consciousness is by no means limited to cerebral action, 

 nor dependent on the presence of a brain. Lewes affirms 

 that the absence of brain does not necessarily imply the ab- 



