MENTAL PHENOMENA IK ACEPHALOUS ANIMALS. 7 



sence of all consciousness, that consciousness is only mainly 

 dependent on brain, and that there are other centres of 

 sensation and volition than the brain. Carpenter also points 

 out that consciousness remains after removal of the cerebrum, 

 and that sensations and sensori-motor actions occur inde- 

 pendently of it. There are other authors who regard con- 

 sciousness as a property of all nervous matter. 



In connection with the important subjects of conscious- 

 ness and volition the student cannot give too close and early 

 attention to 



1. The functions of the spinal cord in man and other 

 animals. While some authors believe it to possess purely 

 reflex functions only, others are of opinion that its functions 

 include sensation and volition (Maudsley). 



2. The phenomena of primary and secondary automatic 

 mental action in man ; the transition of consciousness into 

 unconsciousness ; the effects of habit and repetition on men- 

 tal action. Primary automatic mental action in man and 

 other animals is that which is simply reflex ab initio ; while 

 secondary mechanical mental action is that which, at first 

 the result of intelligence, consciousness and will, becomes in 

 course of time, by the repetition of action, practice or habit, 

 unconscious and involuntary, or at least non-voluntary. The 

 whole subject of unconscious cerebration in man (Carpenter), 

 unconsciousness in mind (Holmes), and unconscious memory 

 (Maudsley), is pregnant with interest. 



3. The essential constituents, or nature, and the range, of 

 intelligence, consciousness, and volition. 



Some physiologists draw what must be regarded as un- 

 tenable and artificial distinctions between reality and resem- 

 blance in conscious and unconscious mental action. They 

 suggest, if they do not assert, that purposive actions may 

 possess a false appearance of ideation, a deceptive volition ; 

 that they may be merely apparently purposive or adapted ; 

 that they are seemingly only directed by will and accom- 

 panied by consciousness volition, consciousness, design or 

 intention being all in reality absent. They refer only to 

 apparent design in headless animals, and to reflex action, 



