682 THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 



some writers, even of high authority, are in their use of 

 the terms "three miles or the range of guns," as if they 

 were now synonymous, which they are not. Such looseness 

 of phrase is not absent from some judicial decisions on the 

 question, as in that of Lord Cockburn in the case of Regina 

 v. Keyn, previously referred to (p. 591). 



Another statement that one not uncommonly finds in the 

 text-books, and to which currency was given by Lord Stowell, 

 is that since the invention of firearms the distance at which 

 the power of the state, and therefore the territorial waters, 

 terminated, has usually been recognised as about three miles 

 from the shore. Calvo, a writer of much authority, also makes 

 this statement, affirming at the same time the doctrine of 

 Bynkershoek as the principle of delimitation. 1 In view of the 

 range of modern artillery, he, however, considers this space too 

 small, and is of opinion that it ought justly, on grounds of 

 logic and reason, to be extended ; but until this extension has 

 been sanctioned by a majority of states he looks upon the 

 three-mile limit as the established rule of international law. 

 Much the same view is expressed by Bluntschli. 2 He defines 

 the territorial sea according to the range of guns, and says 

 that international treaties or the laws of states may fix more 

 precise limits, such as one marine league from the coast at 

 low-water; but, considering the increased range of artillery, 

 he is disposed to think the three-mile limit insufficient. Philli- 

 more, one of the greatest English authorities, agrees with Calvo. 3 

 He states that the rule of law may now be considered as fairly 

 established that absolute property and jurisdiction in the ad- 

 jacent open sea "does not extend, unless by the specific pro- 

 visions of a treaty, or an unquestioned usage, beyond a marine 

 league (being three miles) or the distance of a cannon-shot 

 from the shore at low tide." The limit, he says, was fixed at a 

 marine league because that was supposed to be the utmost 

 distance to which a cannon-shot from the shore could reach; 



1 Le Droit International, i. 349 ; Diet, de Droit International, 501. Bluntschli 

 endeavours to place the doctrine on a philosophical but absurd basis, by stating 

 that the sovereignty over the sea extended originally only to a stone's-throw from 

 the coast, later to an arrow-shot, and then according to the range of firearms. 



2 Das Moderne Volkerrecht, s. 307-9. 



3 Commentaries upon International Law, I. viii. cxcviii. 



