THE DA WN OF MIND. 125 



and forever inconceivable," protests the German 

 phj^siologist, "that a number of atoms of Carbon, 

 Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Oxygen, and so on, shall be other 

 than indifferent as to how they are disposed and how 

 they move, how they were disposed and how they 

 moved, how they will be disposed and how they will 

 be moved. It is utterly inconceivable how conscious- 

 ness shall arise from their joint action." ^ So im- 

 pressed is even Mr. Lloyd Morgan, mental evolutionist 

 though he be, with the gap between the Minds of Man 

 and brute that his language is almost as strong : " I 

 for one do not for a moment question that the mental 

 processes of man and animals are alike products of 

 evolution. The power of cognizing relations, reflection 

 and introspection, appear to me to mark a new de- 

 parture in evolution," ^ and " I am not prepared to say 

 that there is a difference in kind between the mind of 

 man and the mind of a dog. This would imply a dif- 

 ference in origin or a difference in the essential nature 

 of its being. There is a great and marked difference 

 in kind between the material processes which we call 

 physiological and the mental processes we call psychi- 

 cal. They belong to wholly different orders of being. 

 I see no reason for believing that mental processes in 

 man differ thus in kind from mental processes in ani- 

 mals. But I do think that we have, in tlie introduc- 

 tion of the analytic faculty, so definite and marked a 

 new departure that we should emphasize it by saying 

 that the faculty of perception, in its various specific 

 grades, differs generically from the faculty of concep- 



1 Du Bois-Reymond, Ueber die 'Grenzen des NaturerkennenSj 

 p. 42. 



2 C. Lloyd Morgan, Nature, Sept. 1, 1892, p. 417. 



