130 THE DA WN OF MIND. 



Let us turn, however, to the second source of infor- 

 mation — Mind in the lower Animals. 



That animals have " Minds " is a fact which prob- 

 ably no one now disputes. Stories of " Animal Intelli- 

 gence" and "Animal Sagacity" in dogs and bees and 

 ants and elephants and a hundred other creatures 

 have been told us from childhood with redundant re- 

 iteration. The old protest that animals have no Mind 

 but only instinct has lost its point. In addition to 

 instincts, animals betray intelligence, and often a 

 high degree of intelligence ; they share our feelings 

 and emotions; they have memories; they form per- 

 cepts ; they invent new ways of satisfying their 

 desires, they learn by experience. It is true their 

 Minds want much, and all that is highest ; but the 

 point is that they actually have Minds, whatever their 

 quantity and whatever their quality.^ If abstraction, 

 as Locke says, " is an excellency which the faculties of 

 brutes do by no means attain to," we cannot on that 

 account deny them Mind, but only that height of 

 Mind which men have, and which Evolution would 

 never look for m any living thing but Man. An 



1 As to the exact point of the difference, Mr. Romanes draws 

 the line at the exclusive possession by Man of the power of intro- 

 spective reflection in the light of self-consciousness. " Wherein," 

 he asks, " does the distinction truly consist ? It consists in the 

 power which the human being displays of objectifying ideas, or of 

 setting one state of mind before another state, and contemplating 

 the relation between them. The power to think is— or, as 1 

 should prefer to state it, the power to think at all — is the power 

 which is given by introspective reflection in the light of self-con- 

 sciousness. . . . We have no evidence to show that any 

 animal is capable of thus objectifying its own ideas ; and, there- 

 fore, we have no evidence that any animal is capable of judg* 



