594 



The Rkview of Reviews. 



policy dictated by the situation and which 

 alone can ensure peace. 



"As the navy is an urgent 



^^y "°' need of the country, let it 



a Permanent ,■, i ^ r 



Winston Churchill ? Speedily have a firm foun- 

 dation," runs a Japanese 

 Imperial rescript. " You cannot go round 

 the corner and buy a battleship like a pound 

 of tea," says Lord Fisher. The Navy is a 

 national, not a party matter ; it is a vital 

 matter to us all ; it lets parties bicker, allows 

 us to enjoy the luxury of inefficiency in the 

 Army, at the Board of Trade, and elsewhere. 

 Not only does the Empire exist to-day, 

 thanks to the Navy, but the peace of the 

 world depends upon it. Why then should 

 we allow the affiiirs of the Navy, which 

 depend for efficiency upon continuity 

 and not upon chopping and changing, to 

 remain the sport and plaything of election 

 agents' organisation, or party politicians' exi- 

 gencies r The public and the electors are 

 unanimous for a strong Navy — a referendum 

 is not needed to show that — so why expose 

 the Admiralty to the disadvantages of 

 party and elections ? In Japan, where 

 it is held that " in matters of national de- 

 fence a single day's neglect may involve 

 a century's regret," there exists continuity 

 at the Admiralty — and the Japanese navy 

 is not the least efficient. Why should 

 we not free the Admiralty from the lottery 

 of party selection and reward, and determine 

 that when we find a suitable man we shall 

 continue to use him where he is most use- 

 ful ? There are few statesmen — too few — wIuj 

 can grasp the grand policy for a century to 

 come, and in naval matters it is these who 

 count. Mr. Winston Churchill is singularly 

 fitted for such a departure from precedent, 

 since he is at once of all parties and of no 

 party. Party is not wanted in the Navy, 

 and party changes do liarm abroad. We 



have a definite policy in naval matters — we 

 must have, else we and peace will disappear. 

 Mr. Churchill has grasped this fact, as he 

 has shown by his actions, when he said, 

 speaking of naval policy, " upon that precise 

 object is directed all that the science of our 

 age can boast, all the wealth of our country, 

 all the resources of our civilisation, all the 

 patience, study, devotion to duty, sacrifice 

 of personal interests which our naval officers 

 and men supply." This is proper lan- 

 guage, and we would rather perpetuate the 

 speaker's right to speak thus than risk the 

 Navy's future upon a dip into the party 

 unlucky bag. 



Events have conspired to 

 The Situation ^f^o^d to Mr. Churchill an 



the Mediterranean, opportunity tO show that 

 he is worthy to be per- 

 manent Minister of the Navy. The situa- 

 tion in the Mediterranean needs readjust- 

 ment if we arc not to declare our readiness 

 to abandon Malta, Egypt, and the direct 

 route to India. Thanks to our entente 

 with France, we have concentrated our 

 fleets more and more at the point of 

 supreme crisis, and now have no longer 

 a fleet worthy the name in the Middle 

 Sea. Italy and Austria are building 

 Dreadnoughts in ever-increasing proportion, 

 and while we have no other desire nor jiros- 

 pect than of peace with these two countries — 

 in fact, many things jjoint to an entente with 

 Italy- we cannot overlook the fact that they 

 are allied with Germany. Can we leave 

 the whole question of the Mediterranean 

 and our route to India, our position in 

 I'.gyjjt, ill the hands of another nation, even 

 of one with which we are as closely bound 

 as France: It is contrary to the ideas 

 upon which the British Empire has been 

 reared. Garrisons at Malta and Egyptian 

 armies do not affect tlic situation — the 



