641 



Leading Articles in the Reviews. 



WHO IS TO CONTROL THE 

 DARDANELLKS ? 



Writinc in Questions Diploinatiques el Coluniales lor 

 May i6, Commander dc Thomasson deals with the 

 question of the Dardanelles in an article entitled " 'I'he 

 Command of the Mediterranean." 



THF. AMBITION OF FRANCK. 



He begins by referring to two previous artiiles in the 

 same review (February i6th and July ist, iqio). in 

 which it was soui;ht to demonstrate the great advan- 

 tages which France might derives from offensive opera- 

 tions in the Mediterranean. The writers point out that 

 the combined forces of France and England, with 

 Gibraltar, Toulon. Ajaccio, Malta, and Bizerta as naval 

 bases, were already in command of the Western Mediter- 

 ranean, and that they should endeavour to obtam 

 as soon as possible similar conditions in the F^ast and 

 in the Adriatic. In short, the two Powers, while 

 respecting the Italian fleet, should make it their busi- 

 ness to crush that of Austria, or at least shut it up at 

 Pola or at Cattaro. The present writer in the re\-icw 

 arids that the disappearance of the flags of .\ustrian 

 .ind German commerce from the .Mediterranean 

 \vould inconvenience considerably the revictualling of 

 (iermany in time of war. 



CO-OPERATION OF BRITISH FLEET ESSENTIAL. 



The importance of France maintaining a strong 

 position in the Mediterranean is recognised, and it is 

 .idmitted that almost all her ships of the line ought to 

 be concentrated in that sea. But it is evident that if 

 I'Vance is to prepare for action in the minimum of 

 lime, her fleet must be superior to the combined fleets 

 of Austria .md Italy, and this not because the co-opera- 

 tion of these two fleets is certain, but because 

 in making plans of a warlike nature it would be 

 'ulpable not to imagine the worst. .Since the support 

 of the British fleet is essential to France at the present 

 moment, the writer views with concern the recent 

 redistribution of the British squadrons. 



THE NAVAL BALANCE OF POWER. 



In 1912 the position of the Powers as regards ships 

 of the f^rst line is that Austria and Italy combined have 

 twenty-five, France and England combined forty-eight, 

 and France alone twenty-eight. Thus, if FVan'cc may 

 reckon on the support of the British squadron, she is 

 in a position lor vigorous action, but if she has to stand 

 alone, her superiority over the combined fleets of 

 .Austria and Italy is very small. In 1915 the posi- 

 tion will be worse. France will then have only 

 twenty-seven ships to oppose lo .Austria and Italv, 

 with si.xteen each. As Lord Charles IUr'4ord has 

 |)ointcd out. the increase by 1015 in the Austrian and 

 Italian navic-; will imply the ne(essity for Kngland to 

 maintain in ihc Mediterranean a scju.-idron of eiqht of 

 the most modem and powerful ironi lads, reducing by 

 that numl)cr the forces which we have in home waters 



RUSSIA IN THE BLACK SEA. 



The conclusion of the whole matter is that from the 

 point of view of the future command of the Medi- 

 terranean the greatest importance is to be attached 

 to the condition of the R'assian navy in the Black Sea. 

 -At the present moment the Russian squadron in the 

 iilack Sea consists of four ships. The new naval pro- 

 gramme provides for a reinforcement of three Dread- 

 noughts and four torpedo-boats. The construction of 

 them, which has recently been put in hand, is entrusted 

 to a Russian company served by F'rench capital and 

 British constructors — the Triple Entente applied to 

 naval construction. The first aim of Russia, doubtless, 

 is to maintain her authority in the Black Sea, not 

 merely over the small navies of Roumania and Bulgaria, 

 but over the Turkish fleet, which the rulers of Turkey 

 have proposed to establish by acquiring ships from 

 Germany and England and guns from France and 

 England. 



THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF TURKEY. 



.At the same time, it is evident that Russia cannot 

 desire such a strong force to be permanently confined 

 to the I31ack Sea. In all probability the question of the 

 Straits will be re-opened. F"or two centuries Russia has 

 been fighting for a solution of this question. Turkey, 

 who regards everything as an attempt against her 

 sovereign rights, offers the most active opposition. So 

 far as she is concerned the question has been settled 

 many times — to her advantage. Not onlv does she 

 consider herself mistress of the Straits in the course of 

 a war in which she is engaged, but she professes to be 

 free to close and to open the passage to commercial 

 navigation as she chooses, and it is very diflficult to 

 contest this right. Should the question again come 

 before Europe for settlement, it is probable that 

 resistance to Russia's demands will come from Germanv 

 and Austria, for the two allied Empires have no desire 

 to see the blue cross of St. .Andrew make its reappear- 

 ance in the Mediterranean. 



WHAT Kl'SSlA SHOUI.n DO. 



It might be objected that freedom of the Straits 

 would permit Russia to have a permanent naval station 

 in the .Mediterranean, and that, in consequence, when 

 war broke out a union of the Russian squadron with 

 the allied fleets might take place. But it is verv ' 

 doubtful whether in the period of political tension 

 preceding hostilities Russia would leave her ships in 

 the Mediterranean. Free access to the .Mediter- 

 ranean seems to have no real interest for Russia 

 except on the hypothesis of a distant war, such as that 

 against japan. In a Mediterranean 1 oiiflict the import- 

 ant thing for Russia to do is to win the good graces 

 of Turkey. One may suppose that in a war Turkcv 

 would think twice bei'ore committing any act of hos- 

 tilit\- against the Triple JCntente. 



