What ihe Mediterranean Means to Us. 



35 



mcdan world, the Caliphate. .\nd wc arc the greatest 

 Mohammedan Empire, with millions of believers in the 

 Caliph in our many colonies and provinces. How can 

 we, how dare we, lose for them the possibility of pro- 

 tecting, or. at any rate, befriending the Caliph ? The 

 loss of prestige would be enormous, the danger to 

 India very serious. .\nd yet without an adequate fleet 

 in the Mediterranean we cannot c\en dream of having 

 any say in events at Constantinople. .\nd we must 

 reconcile ourselves to the abandonment of an\- ide;i of 



always the chance that, left to themselves, the Kilkenny 

 cats may not fight amongst themselves, but combine 

 against the keeper of the gate — and who could blame 

 them if they did } An Empire which goes back loses 

 prestige, and prestige counts more than many legions. 

 .\nd so there is no real alternative before .Mr. Winston 

 Churchill but to insist in the Cabinet that steps be at 

 once taken such as will enable us to maintain a fleet 

 equal to the combined .\ustrian and Italian forces both 

 in numbers and in quality, based upon .Malta, that 



RUSSIAN EMPIRE / 



1 





■V?''' 



x^ 



CH6NA T^V^r-"^ 

 V 5,c 



'''a ,S700. 



^^-•v 



CAPE TOWN'-, 

 6150 



LONDON TO ^. 

 MELBOURNE 

 10. 870 



PECTM.] 



LONDON to .MELeOURNe 11.950 mil» J 



SVDNEV To 

 Wellington' 



1150 



MEIBOUPNE ■' 



Map showing distances via Mediterranean and via the Cape. 

 It will be seen lli.u u> liulij vi,i Sue/, is a[niro.idin.ili:ly llic .■..iiiiu ilistancc a.< lo Cape Tumi ali.nr 



ai ti\i' irit niMiip with Italy, which must be lost by the 

 abandonment of the Mediterranean. The argument of 

 those who say that wc, holding Ciibraltar and .Xden. 

 will be able to seal up the Mediterranean, and that we 

 will be able to delend Egypt from the Red .Sea, ignore 

 '\ the interests which we have in the Mediterranean 

 :i .elf, and whicli wi- must lose if we cannot conic in, 

 even if the others cannot come out. Of course, the idea 

 of letting the French, Austrian, and Italian lleets 

 destroy each other like Kilkenny cats while we hold 

 the two entrances might Ijc ultraclive, but there Is 



strategic nerve centre of the Mediterranean. Wc ilo 

 not \enlure to suggest to so able a .Minister how this 

 can be attained with the least delay, but we would 

 remind him that by a naval loan and a purchase of 

 1 ireadnoughts buililing for other countries in England, 

 notably South .\nierican republics, much could be 

 accomplished. It might coNt more, but the gain in 

 prestige, the reiteration of Hritish determination to 

 make itself " feared and iv.pected e\en in the most 

 untoward circum-.t.ince.;, would be worth even lie.ivier 

 expenditure." Our duty as the Policeman of the peace 



