Leading Articles in the Reviews. 



67 



since 1880. the writer ventures tlie opinion that the 

 extension of Empire by Great Britain is liascd less on 

 the acquisition of raw materials than on the anxietv 

 to preserve the markets menaced by German industries. 

 Raw materials, the products of the tropics, are sold 

 everywhere at market prices. Quite different is the 

 sale of industrial products in Asiatic and African 

 markets. Here Imperialism acts as a protectionist wall 

 of insurmountable heis^ht. In the light of economic 

 history, German hatred of England is not so much a 

 mental aberration on the part of German Imperialists 

 as the expression of a revolt based on economics of the 

 wealthy classes of Germany at the immense extension 

 of the British Empire in the last decades, by which 

 German industrial exports are practically excluded 

 from free competition in all African and Asiatic 

 markets which Great Britain has annexed. 



of an alliance hUIi France. The true line of advance may be 

 founil in an attempt to combine the policy of the Haldane 

 mission with the abortive efTorts of the Caillaux negotiations : 



in short, in a Franco-Anglo-German understanding. 



WIlA'l^ THE BALANCE OF POWER 

 MEANS. 



W'riiing in the Conleiiiporary Review for Julv on 



■ Germany and the Balance of Power," Mr. H. N. 



Ilrailsford strips off the vestments of traditional names 



,md shows us what he conceives to be the naked realitv 



thatlies behind the formal balanceof power. Hesays: — 



An aristocratic society measured wealth in terms of land. Its 

 conception of the aims of international policy became obsolete 

 "lih the decadence of the landed class. Territory, conceived as 

 l.ind which noble conquerors may parcel out as the fruit of 

 \ iciory, is no longer the good for which nations strive. We 

 liave left behind us almost asakolutely the phase when the trade 

 in SDuds alone dominated the politics of Europe. The material 

 ~iake in foreign policy meant through three-fourths of last 

 •jcntiiry primarily the export of goods. We were traders con- 

 ..crned only that the sea-roads should be open to our ships, and 

 (he world's markets open to our produce. . . . We may date 

 the modern phase from the 'eighties of last century, which saw 

 ■jur descent on Egypt in the interests of the Khedive's bond- 

 holders. Unarce rather than commerce is its prime material 

 s'ake, the export of capital even more than the export of goods, 

 the acquisition of concessions, loans, and spheres of economic 

 penetration and monopoly rather than markets for our manu- 

 iaciurcs, . . . The real conlficts of recent years have not turned 

 on the export of goods. Their pi.ot is the ambition of rival 

 national groups of financiers to monopolise the construction of 

 railways and public works, to secure the profits of launching 

 and manipulating foreign loans, and to mortgage the revenues 

 assigned lor their service. Economists like Mr. J. A. Ilnbson, 

 <nd statisiicians like Sir George I'aish. have called attention to 

 le fact that profits from this export of capital abro-ad now 

 . Lstly excectl the profits from the export of goods. . . . Our 

 inds, our frontiers, our nationality, our religion, our constilu- 

 I >n— none of these things will ever again be at stake in a 

 I uropcan war. When we allow ourselves to talk of niain- 

 Mming a balance and resisting the hegemony of a great military 

 Tower, we are using the traditions of William ol Orange and 

 I'itl to dignify the rivalries of modern loan-mongers and African 

 (.onces^ionnaires. The eflfott to secure a balance favourable to 

 oneself and one's allies means in the concrete nothing more than 

 an atlenipl, by measuring armaments and by diplomatic sleight- 

 of-hand, to secure opportunities abroad for the exportation of 

 iccumulatcd capital and the expansion of national enterprises. 



It is an economii: aim that has been pursued by 

 Germany throughout the conllicts of recent years. 

 Mr. Braiisford concludes : — 



There arc difficulties in any isoIalc<l Anglo-German under- 

 landing. There are insuperable obstacles to the rival policy 



"THE ONLY WAY TO PLEASE 

 JOHN BULL." 



The North American Revieiv publishes certain 

 letters of .Samuel Morse, one of the best American 

 painters of the first half of the nineteenth century, 

 but better known as the inventor of the telegraph. 

 The young man of twenty-one was in England 

 at the time of the declaration of the war of 

 1S12. His letters home are declared by Mr. Edward 

 L. .Morse, who contributes them, a singularly shrewd 

 insight into the international situation, into the British 

 character, and into the developments of the future. 

 He describes the remarkable change wrought by the 

 war in British sentiment towards the United States, a 

 change from contempt to respect. He says : — 



'Tis the character of Englishmen to be haughty, proud, and 

 overbearing. If this conduct meets with no resistance their 

 treatment becomes more imperious, and the more submissive 

 ..Tjid conciliating is the object of their imperiousness the more 

 tyrannical are they toward it. This has been their uniform 

 treatment of us, and this character pervades all ranks of society, 

 whether in public or private life. 



The only way to please John 13ull is to give him a good 

 beating, and such is the singularity of his character that the 

 more you beat him the greater is his respect for you and the 

 more he will esteem you. 



HOW TO S.WE THE EMPIRE. 



In the Rajput Herald for April and May T. S. ]. 

 Seesodia sets out to tell us how to save the British 

 Empire. He says ; — 



There is only one solution that will effectively safeguard 

 against the inevitable historical conclusion of the disruption of 

 disorganised and huge Empires, and that is the proper develop- 

 ment of the Empire on a strong and consolidated basis. This 

 basis can only be formed by a tangible and practical recognition 

 of India as a unit, and an equal unit, in the Hrilish Empire, 

 and the treatment of the Indians, not as people of India, but as 

 people of the Hritish Empire. 



He complains that the apostles of mercenary 

 Imperialism cannot grasp the significance of senti- 

 ment : — 



To the people of India, as it is to all peoples of .\sia, senti- 

 ment is the first and foremost consideration, and, in fact, to all 

 nations who believe in religion and its speculations sentiment 

 is almost a necesiiity — whether one realises it or not. If craving 

 for justice and righteousness should be construed as mere senti- 

 mentality, we hold that sentimentality is an essential element of 

 administration without which politics would be merely a game 

 of tricksters and tyrants. The Indian should be allowed equal 

 chances of governing any area of the Uiiiish Empire as the 

 Briton has today in India, An In<lian statesitian svho happens 

 to be clever, capable and great should be placed in a position 

 to utilise his capacities and inlelligence in any part of the British 

 Empire, What we want is that Indian talent should he e<iually 

 recognised with any other, and facilities should be .atl'orded to 

 the Indian to utilise it to the advantage of the Empire to which 

 he belongs. ,\s the Indian civil service is open to all subjects 

 of the British Empire, so should the civil service of the British 

 Empire, of England, Scotland, Canada, Australia, be open to 

 Indians, who are part and parcel of the Empire, 



