Bulgaria and the Macedonian Prohlem. 



293 



to the island of Crete by the guaranteeing Powers, 

 in spite of the unsuccessful war of Greece in 1897 ; 

 the conviction that freedom will be obtained onl)- 

 after heavy sacrifices; the growth of public instruction ; 

 the progress of the neighbouring Christian countries ; 

 the spread of Western notions and ideals, consequent 

 upon the amelioration of the means of communication ; 

 the incapacity of the Turkish administration to mend 

 itself, to conform its system of government to the 

 modified conditions of life of the Turks themselves ; 

 and, last but not least, the continued excesses which 

 render life an intolerable burden — are these reasons 

 not enough to explain the Macedonian troubles ? 

 Our neighbours pretend that we have encouraged these 

 troubles in order to East Roumclianise Macedonia, 

 and then repeat the Philippopolis coup d'etat of 18S5. 

 I repeat lliat this encouragement cannot be proved. 

 I affirm that what we want is not to East Roumelianise, 

 but to Lcbanonise Macedonia. And the example of 

 Lebanon, as well as that of the island of Samos, proves 

 that Turkish provinces with Christian governors can 

 exist for long years without developing in their 

 population " the desire for incorporation " into a 

 neighbouring Christian State. Three-quarters of the 

 East Rounielian population were Bulgarian. She had 

 no Turkish troops, no Ottoman garrisons. The 

 conditions not only of the political constitutions, but 

 of the ethnic elements and of the frontier defences of 

 Lebanonised Macedonia, will be so different from those 

 of East Roumelia that no new edition of the Philip- 

 popolis experiment of 1888 will be possible. No fear, 

 therefore, of a new disturbance of the balance of 

 power in the Balkan peninsula and no distrust of 

 Bulgaria's designs should inspire the policy of our 

 neighbours. It may sound like a paradox, but it is 

 true in fact, that with respect to .Alacedonia. Bulgaria 

 is the most conservative and the least sub\ersive of 

 all the Christian States south of the Danube. She is 

 against the partition of Macedonia, against any 

 change in the present political map of the Balkan 

 peninsula. Had she lent a willing ear to the hints 

 thrown out to her, especially during the Gra;co- 

 Turkish War of 1897, that map would probably have 

 been changed. All she wants is the entire execution 

 of the Treaty of Berlin, which established this map, 

 the applic.ition of the 25th Article, and the repetition 

 in Europe of an experiment which, ha\ing succeederl 

 in Asia, is sure to succeed in our part of the world 

 also. Anrl I do not see any reason why this policy 

 should be suspected by our neighbours. It is a policy 

 which should commend itself to all of them, as all 

 suffer from some at least of the diffirulties due to the 

 Macedonian danger. 'I'hey all sh(juld unite to put an 

 end to the latest and worst curse of Macedonia — the 

 mutual slaughter of its different Christian nationalities 

 — a curse which recalls the saddest pages of the mutual 

 extermination of Druses and Maronites in the province 

 of Lebanon forty-five years ago. They all shoulfl join 

 their efforts to ap[)ly the Lebanon remedy to Macedonia 

 also, to obtain lor her such reforms as will guarantee 



to her different ethnic groups — Bulgarian, Greek, 

 Servian, Roumanian and Mussulman — equal security 

 of life, honour and property, and etjual chances for 

 progress and prosperity. 



I have insisted so much upon the necessity of intro- 

 ducing into Macedonia an organisation similar to that 

 of Lebanon, that \ery little remains to be said about 

 the reforms themselves. In those reforms, whatever 

 be the means proposed for their attainment, all 

 Bulgarians concur. Macedonia for the ]\Iacedonians ; 

 the control of the Powers ; an efficacious self-govern- 

 ment extended to the sandjaks, cazas and communes ; 

 equalit)- for all languages, freedom for all creeds ; the 

 financial and other reforms in favour of which, 

 according to one of Lord Lansdowne's speeches, there 

 is now a consensus of the Powers — those are the 

 unanimous demands of the Bulgarians. A European 

 Lebanon under European control — that is the solution 

 which the Powers ought to obtain by moral pressure. 



Should the simple application of moral pressure fail 

 to produce the expected result, the European concert 

 ought to reserve to itself the- right to take such other 

 or further action as may be made necessary by future 

 events. " The independence of the Ottoman Porte," 

 wrote Lord Salisbury in the above-mentioned dispatch 

 of January 4th, 1877, " is a phrase which is, of course, 

 capable of different interpretations. At the present 

 time it must be interpreted so as to be consistent 

 with the conjoint military and diplomatic action 

 taken in recent years b\' the Powers which signed 

 the Treaty of Paris. If the Porte had been independent 

 in the sense in which the guaranteeing Powers are 

 independent, it would not have stood in need of a 

 guarantee. The military sacrifice made by the two 

 Western Powers twenty years ago to save it from 

 flestruction and the conference which is now being 

 held to avert an analogous danger would have been 

 an unnecessar\- interference if Turkey had been a 

 Power which did not depend on the protection of 

 others for its existence." 



.'\cling on the principle so categorically affirmed 

 by Lord Salisbury and so consistently .applied liy 

 Europe since the Crimean War, the Powers found 

 the means to pacify the province of Lebanon and 

 the island of Crete. In the fifth sitting of the Congress 

 of Berlin Lord Jieaconsfield declared that he was 

 authorised by his Government to accept the Austro- 

 Hungarian amendment, which he regarded as a wise 

 and prudent one, concerning the formation of a foreign 

 auxiliary army for Bulgaria, and added that England 

 was ready to furnish its quota of the contingent. 

 Having this readiness in view, and encouraged by the 

 success of the experiments in l.elianon and Crete, one 

 may be permitted to hope that the pacification of 

 Macedonia will not be beyond the statecraft of the 

 Powers, provided they arc determined, to quote Lord 

 Lansdowne's words, " to urge their claims in the 

 great <-ause of humanity," and to put an end to that 

 " standing menace to the peace of Europe " which is 

 called the Macedonipn question. 



