156 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS v 



volition, though they are no inconsiderable " kinds 

 of action to which the nervous system ministers," 

 and memory has a place in his classification only 

 by implication. Secondly, we are told that the 

 second "kind of action to which the nervous 

 system ministers " is " that in which stimuli from 

 without result in sensations through the agency 

 of which their due effects are wrought out. 

 Sensation." Does this really mean that, in the 

 writer's opinion, "sensation" is the "agent" by 

 which the " due effect " of the stimulus, which 

 gives rise to sensation, is " wrought out " ? 

 Suppose somebody runs a pin into me. The 

 " due effect " of that particular stimulus will 

 probably be threefold ; namely, a sensation of 

 pain, a start, and an interjectional expletive. 

 Does the Quarterly Reviewer really think that 

 the " sensation " is the " agent " by which the 

 other two phenomena are wrought out ? 



But these matters are of little moment to 

 anyone but the Reviewer and those persons who 

 may incautiously take their physiology, or psycho- 

 logy, from him. The really interesting point is 

 this, that when he fully admits that animals 

 " may possess all the first four groups of actions," 

 he grants all that is necessary for the purposes of 

 the evolutionist. For he hereby admits that in 

 animals " impressions received result in sensations 

 which give rise to the observation of sensible 

 objects," and that they have what he calls 



