v MIL DARWIN'S CRITICS 1G1 



serious objections if the evidence that animals feel 

 is insufficient to prove that they really do so. What 

 is the value of the evidence which leads one to 

 believe that one's fellow-man feels ? The only 

 evidence in this argument of analogy is the 

 similarity of his structure and of his actions to 

 one's own. And if that is good enough to prove 

 that one's fellow-man feels, surely it is good 

 enough to prove that an ape feels. For the differ- 

 ences of structure and function between men and 

 apes are utterly insufficient to warrant the 

 assumption that while men have those states of 

 consciousness we call sensations apes have nothing 

 of the kind. Moreover, we have as good evidence 

 that apes are capable of emotion and volition as 

 we have that men other than ourselves are. But 

 if apes possess three out of the four kinds of states 

 of consciousness which we discover in ourselves, 

 what possible reason is there for denying them the 

 fourth ? If they are capable of sensation, emotion, 

 and volition, why are they to be denied thought 

 (in the sense of predication) ? 



No answer has ever been given to these 

 questions. And as the law of continuity is as 

 much opposed, as is the common sense of man- 

 kind, to the notion that all animals are unconscious 

 machines, it may safely be assumed that no 

 sufficient answer ever will be given to them. 



There is every reason to believe that con- 

 sciousness is a function of nervous matter, when 



