SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 129 



abounds in equally large assumptions. It may 

 be criticized first scientifically, and that is well; 

 what remains may then be criticized philosophi- 

 cally, which is, for developing a fit and proper 

 frame of mind, still better. 



Now we have in Metaphysics a critical disci- 

 pline in consistent thinking; it has an ideal of 

 complete explanation; and it is able to test 

 scientific theories with reference to this ideal 

 formal standard. In this sense Metaphysics 

 functions as a sublime Logic, testing the com- 

 pleteness and consistency of our scientific descrip- 

 tions, whether of things as they are, or of the way 

 in which they have come to be, and it is desirable 

 for the sake of Science that it should be used* 

 The account that a Science gives of part of the 

 world must be not only self-consistent, and con- 

 gruent with the results of other sciences, it must 

 also submit to the formal requirements of meta- 

 physics. This criticism of categories and sy sterna- 

 tizations is the chief service that Metaphysics has 

 to render to science. 



From this point of view, Philosophy has been 

 called "scientia scientiarum" "a science which 

 determines the principles and conditions, the 

 limits and relations of the sciences." But to this 

 claim vigorous objections have been raised. For 

 it is the strong opinion of many who have made 

 great contributions to science, that the scientific 



