1246 MISCELLANEOUS. 



extend its exclusive dominion over the sea adjoining its territories, and 

 beyond those portions of the sea which are embraced by harbors, gulfs, 

 bays, and estuaries, and over which its jurisdiction unquestionably 

 extends. All that can be reasonably asserted is, that the dominion 

 of the sovereign of the shore over the contiguous sea extends as far as 

 is requisite for his safety and for some lawful end. A more extended 

 dominion must rest entirely upon force and maritime supremacy. 

 According to the current of modern authority, the general territorial 

 jurisdiction extends into the sea as far as cannon-shot will reach, and 

 no farther, and this is generally calculated to be a marine league; and 

 the Congress of the United States have recognised this limitation by 

 authorizing the district courts to take cognizance of all captures made 

 within a marine league of the American shores. The executive author- 

 ity of this country, in 1793, considered the whole of Delaware bay to 

 be within our territorial jurisdiction, and it rested its claim upon those 

 authorities which admit that gulfs, channels, and arms of the sea be- 

 long to the people with whose land they are encompassed. It was inti- 

 mated that the law of nations would justify the United States in at- 

 taching to their coasts an extent into the sea beyond the reach of can- 

 non-shot. Considering the great extent of the line of the American 

 coasts, we have a right to claim for fiscal and defensive regulations a 

 liberal extension of maritime jurisdiction; and it would not be unrea- 

 sonable, as I apprehend, to assume, for domestic purposes connected 

 with our safety and welfare, the control of the waters on our coast, 

 though included within lines stretching from quite distant headlands, 

 as, for instance, from Cape Ann to Cape Cod, and from Nantucket to 

 Montauk point, and from that point to the capes of the Delaware, and 

 from the south cape of Florida to the Mississippi. It is certain that 

 our government would be disposed to view with some uneasiness and 

 sensibility, in the case of war between other maritime powers, the use 

 of the waters of our coast far beyond the reach of cannon-shot as cruis- 

 ing ground for belligerent purposes. In 1793, our government thought 

 they were entitled, in reason, to as broad a margin of protected nav- 

 igation as any nation whatever, though at that time they did not posi- 

 tively insist beyond the distance of a marine league from the sea 

 shores; and in 1806 our government thought it would not be unreason- 

 able, considering the extent of the United States, the shoalness of their 

 coast, and the natural indication furnished by the well-defined path of 

 the Gulf stream, to except an immunity from belligerent warfare for 

 the space between that limit and the American shore.' 



"From the foregoing extract it will be observed that Chancellor 

 Kent agrees with the principles put forth by the law officers of the 

 crown, and which justify the conclusion 'that no foreign power, inde- 

 pendently of treaty, has any right to navigate the passage of Canso.' 

 Haying thus, by the highest legal authorities of England and the 

 United States, been borne out in the assumption that no foreign power 

 has any such right, the next inquiry is, as to where the power of con- 

 trolling the passage of Canso exists. By the act of 1820, Cape Breton 

 was annexed to ISiova Scotia, and has since that period formed a part 

 of this province, which for nearly a century has enjoyed a representa- 

 tive form of government, and which, in making laws, is only controlled 

 by the operation of imperial statutes and the veto of the crown. The 

 right to make laws to affect navigation, except the registry of ships, 

 has been enjoyed and acted upon by this legislature. Various laws 



