QUESTION ONE. 23 



national law upon the inherent right of an independent state to the 

 property within its boundaries. " It follows from this," he says, 

 " that the sovereign power has authority to dispose of its international 

 property and not merely to enjoy it, but burden it with different 

 charges." 



The doctrine of international servitude is also recognized by Span- 

 ish writers of repute. Keference is made to Olivart's Tratado de De- 

 recho International Piiblico, fourth edition (1903), section 53, pages 

 368-372, wherein the doctrine is expounded in accordance with the 

 views already set forth. 



The distinguished writer, publicist, and diplomat, the late M. 

 Charles Calvo, discusses the subject in his Dictionary of International 

 Law (Vol. II, pp. 214-215) and in the third volume of his monu- 

 mental treatise on international law, section 1583 (6th ed.), quoting, 

 among other authorities, Kliiber and Heffter, whose views have 

 already been stated. 



Finally, the doctrine is accepted, and stated in other English works 

 of authority besides that of Oppenheim, notably Phillimore on Inter- 

 national Law, Vol. I, third edition (1879), sections 277-283, pages 

 388-392; Twiss on Law of Nations, Vol. I, second edition (1884). 

 pages 403-104; Creasy (First Platform of International Law (1876), 

 sections 256-261) ; Hall (Treatise on International Law (1904), 5th 

 ed., pages 159-160); Westlake (International Law (1904), Vol. I, 

 pages 60-62). 



In the United States the following authorities treat of servitudes 

 in the same way: Wheaton (International Law, Dana's Edition 

 (1866), sec. 268, citing Vattel and Martens) ; Halleck (International 

 Law (1861). chap, iv, sec. 20, pp. 92-93); Taylor (International 

 Law (1901). pages 263, 299-301, 369) ; Wilson & Tucker (Interna- 

 tional Law (1909), 5th ed., pages 123, 152-153). 



It is thus evident that the doctrine of international servitudes is 

 firmly established in international law and that writers, irrespective 

 of nationality, expound and treat it as such in their various exposi- 

 tions of international law. The matter, however, does not rest there, 

 for not only do writers on international law maintain the doctrine, 

 out the practice of nations, which constitutes the one solid foundation 

 for international law, furnishes innumerable instances from a period 



a Traitd de Droit International, Vol. I (French translation by Leo, 1883), 

 pp. 479-491, sees. 93-95. 



