QUESTION ONE. 61 



THE QUESTION OF SEASONABLE REGULATIONS. 



It is proposed now to examine the special and peculiar form in 

 which Great Britain, with the view, apparently, of escaping the force 

 of the principles of public law applicable to the subject, has stated the 

 British contention in Question One. The British Case does not ad- 

 vance the position that Great Britain is at liberty to make any regu- 

 lation of the fisheries which may suit the purposes of that Govern- 

 ment, but accompanies the contention of an exclusive right to make 

 regulations with the qualification that the regulations must be reason- 

 able. Apparently recogmzing that this would not strengthen the 

 contention in the light of public law, because a right to make reason- 

 able regulations would be in effect a right to make any kind of regula- 

 tions, since that Government would be the sole judge of their reason- 

 ableness, this contention is limited by the further qualification that 

 the regulations must be reasonable from certain view points. 



This Tribunal is thus asked to declare, not that Great Britain has 

 the right to make regulations at will, or to make reasonable regula- 

 tions, but that Great Britain has the right to make regulations which 

 shall be reasonable judged by certain standards set up by the form 

 of this Question. It is necessary to look at and examine these stand- 

 ards in determining the validity of this contention. 



Great Britain contends, as set forth in this Question, for the right 

 without the consent of the United States to make certain regulations 

 if they be reasonable from the view point of their being , 



(a) Appropriate or necessary for the protection and preservation 

 of such fisheries and the exercise of the rights of British subjects 

 therein and of the liberty which by the said article 1 the inhabitants 

 of the United States have therein in common with British subjects; 

 (&) desirable on grounds of public order and morals; (c) equitable 

 and fair as between local fishermen and the inhabitants of the United 

 States exercising the said treaty liberty, and not so framed as to 

 give unfairly an advantage to the former over the latter. 



It is submitted that the concession, thus made respecting the neces- 

 sity of the reasonableness of the regulations from the particular 

 view points set up, does not materially change or alter the question 

 of power to be determined by this Tribunal. The concession is indeed 

 an admission that in principle the power to regulate at will and to any 

 extent does not exist in Great Britain, which would determine against 

 Great Britain all the contentions of Question One. Nevertheless, if 

 Great Britain is to be the sole judge of the reasonableness of the 



