566 



THE NEW BOOK OF THE DOG. 



straying in the road, that it was not in fact 

 kept under proper control, and awarded the 

 plaintiff 23 damages. 



The Divisional Court, however, reversed 

 the decision of the Court below, and allowed 

 the appeal of the dog owner, against whom 

 it was strenuously argued that the fact that 

 the dog was blind was known to its owner, 

 that it was negligently not kept under 

 proper control, and further that a person 

 was entitled to assume that a dog on a 

 highway could see and would behave as a 

 seeing dog, and therefore not blindly run 

 into danger. The Court were unanimous in 

 allowing the appeal, the Lord Chief Justice 

 saying that there was clearly no evidence of 

 negligence on the part of the dog owner. 



Carriage of At common law railway corn- 

 Dogs by Land panies are not common car- 

 and Sea. riers of dogs, which means 



that unless it were their wish to do so they 

 could not be compelled to carry them, and 

 if they did so, they would not be liable for 

 loss or injury unless such injury arose from 

 the negligence or misconduct of the com- 

 pany's servants. By statute, however, a 

 railway company is bound to carry dogs if 

 it has facilities for doing so, but the law 

 does not impose on the company the obliga- 

 tion of an insurer with regard to animals, 

 and as a result the company is only liable 

 to the owner when a dog is injured or killed 

 through the negligence or default of the 

 servants of the company. Unfortunately, 

 however, a railway company is permitted to 

 make conditions limiting the liability it is 

 prepared to assume, but in order to make 

 any such conditions binding on the public 

 two things must necessarily be shown, viz. 

 that the conditions are reasonable, and that 

 there exists a memorandum of the contract 

 between the parties which has been duly 

 signed by the consignor or agent acting for 

 him in the matter. 



Before the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 

 (1854) was passed railway companies acted in 

 a most dictatorial manner to all owners of 

 live stock ; they simply said we will not 

 carry your animals except on the terms that 

 we are not liable in any event ; but the above- 



mentioned Act changed all this, and under 

 it every railway company is bound to- 

 provide proper facilities for receiving and 

 forwarding traffic, and it especially defined 

 the word " traffic " to include animals. 

 The important section, viz. 7, of this Act, 

 enacted that every company shall be liable 

 for the loss of or for any injury done to 

 any horses, cattle, or other animals in the 

 receiving, forwarding, or delivering thereof,, 

 occasioned by the neglect or default of such 

 company, or its servants, notwithstanding 

 any notice, condition or declaration made 

 and given by such company contrary thereto,, 

 or in anywise limiting such liability every 

 such notice, etc., being declared null and 

 void but always providing that nothing in 

 the Act should be construed to prevent the 

 said companies from making such conditions- 

 as shall be adjudged by the Court or judge 

 to be just and reasonable. The section then 

 goes on to say what limit of liability in 

 respect of certain animals might be put upon 

 them by the railway companies unless the 

 persons delivering the same to the railways. 

 should declare at the time of such delivery 

 a higher value, in which case it shall be 

 lawful for the company to demand and 

 receive, by way of compensation for the 

 increased risk and care thereby occasioned,, 

 a reasonable percentage upon the excess of 

 the value so declared above the respective 

 sums so limited as aforesaid, and which shall 

 be paid in addition to the ordinary rate of 

 charge. The Act, of course, puts the onus 

 of proof of value of the animal, and also the 

 amount of the injury done thereto, on the 

 person claiming the compensation. 



In limiting the liability of railway com- 

 panies in respect of certain animals, the 

 section does not specifically mention dogs, 

 but inasmuch as the section clearly refers- 

 to all animals, dogs are held to be included 

 for this purpose, and the case of Harrison v. 

 London Brighton and South Coast Railway 

 (31 L.J, Q.B., 113) is an authority on the 

 point. It has become the general custom, 

 of all railway companies to limit their 

 liability with respect to dogs to the sum of 

 /2, unless as aforesaid the owner, etc.,, 

 declares a higher value. 



