SECTION 5. THE MAN OF GENIUS. 37 



the one hand, the work of generations, and by ignoring, on the 

 other hand, the virtually infinite mass of human reason which 

 obtains outside their sphere of activity. Men are very small 

 indeed, compared to Man. Myriads of so-called men of genius 

 could not have advanced us as far as plodding humanity has 

 actually done. It would be, therefore, idle to hope much from 

 a study of genius, for the roots of knowledge do not lie there. 

 The very vocabulary which the man of genius must employ 

 almost completely dominates and controls his thought, for therein 

 are embodied innumerable discriminations and the generalisations 

 accumulated by mankind, both as regards objects and methods, 

 positively binding him as to the broad road which he is to tread. 

 Consequently, for example, such terms as Conception, Obser- 

 vation, Comparison, Abstraction, Generalisation, Definition, are 

 accepted by thinkers from the past, and are interpreted primarily 

 according to traditional conventions. To learn these terms con- 

 scientiously by heart will no more lead to the appropriate actions 

 than the committing to memory of any series of undeciphered 

 hieroglyphics. And when we proceed a step farther and define 

 what we mean, say, by Observing, we effect this with the help 

 of other symbolic terms, which equally await interpretation by 

 a fresh set of terms, and so on ad ind6fimtum. We are con- 

 strained hence to assume that; the words we employ reflect 

 certain actions or states, and, given an imperfect memory, the 

 difficulty of correct interpretation becomes evident, especially 

 when we remember that from generation to generation actions 

 and states not only vary sensibly, but often conspicuously, to 

 the extent of acquiring a wholly different and even contrary 

 purport and connotation. The growth of languages admirably 

 illustrates this profound socio-historic influence on thought, 

 determined as this growth is by new discoveries, inventions, 

 ways, experiences, errors, and prepossessions. And inasmuch 

 as the task is principally humanity's and not that of any indi- 

 vidual, it follows that the man of alleged genius is also a crea- 

 ture of habit, and is almost completely dependent for proficiency 

 in thinking on the scientific methods very gradually discovered 

 by the race. 1 



in the Positivist Review, Sept. 1st, 1913, where it is shoVn that Comte's 

 fundamental conceptions were not, strictly speaking, his own. Comte illus- 

 trates in this respect the rule. For a detailed refutation of the genius 

 theory see the present author's forthcoming work, The Distinctive Nature 

 of Man. 



"The popular mind spares itself effort by crediting the house to the man 

 who lays the last tile and allowing his co-workers to drop out of view. . . . 

 The resolving of human achievement into contributions of tens of thousands 

 innovating individuals has, therefore, little in common with the theory of 

 progress which gives the glory to a few Great Men." (E. A. Ross, Foundations 

 of Sociology, 1905, pp. 227-228.) 



1 Numerous illustrations in support of our contention in regard to tin- 

 true place of the man of genius will be ^ound scattered throughout this 

 volume. (See Index, under Genius.) 



