SECTION 6 THE PROGRESS OF METHODOLOGICAL THEORY. 41 



we consider that the overwhelming majority of syllogisms in 

 books on logic are fatuously trivial, mostly confirming what no 

 one would ever think worthy of contesting. 



Psychologically the syllogism may be said to depend on the 

 emergence of a doubt concerning the validity of a certain 

 plausible statement; on the consequent suggestion that this 

 doubt would be removed if the statement could be shown to be 

 involved in a more comprehensive and indubitable statement; 

 and, lastly, after reflection, on the more formal setting out of 

 the more comprehensive statement if any such can be found, 

 the middle or mediating statement, and, in the form of a con- 

 clusion, the statement to be proved. The process might be 

 expressed by some such reasoning: "You desired to have it 

 proved that Socrates is mortal. Well, then, if you are able to 

 agree that all men are mortal, and if you can further agree 

 that Socrates is a man, it will follow of necessity that Socrates, 

 being a man, is mortal. Here is, therefore, the proof which 

 you were solicitous to obtain." That is, by employing an in- 

 genious formula, we convert a confused into a clear thought. 

 To avoid that the syllogism should be question-begging, it might 

 formally run: ''Problem: Desired to prove that Socrates is 

 mortal. Proof: If (it be agreed that) all men are mortal, and 

 if (it be agreed that) Socrates is a man, then (it must be agreed 

 that) Socrates is mortal. The proposition that Socrates is mortal 

 is thus proved (for him who agrees to the two conditional 

 statements)." 1 2 



14. In early days, when scarcely anything was known of 

 the vast world, and the vast world seemed very small and like 

 an open book or rather pamphlet," men demanded verbal clearness 

 and consistency in statements as tests which are readily appli- 



1 A well known university professor writes to the author: "I seriously 

 believe that the slow progress of science is largely due to the deterioration 

 of the scientific powers of the young mind in this long enduring official 

 logic oscillating between syllogistic platitudes and ingenious fallacy-hunting, 

 until all real interest in and inquiry into nature and life are lost sight of. 

 and the patient is ready to go on to the bar, or some kindred destination." 



2 Before Mill, logic was almost universally identified with deductive or 

 syllogistic logic. "The rules of logic have nothing to do with the truth 

 or falsity of the premises, but merely teach us to decide (not whether the 

 premises are fairly laid down, but) whether the conclusion follows fairly 

 from the premises or not." (Whately, Elements of Logic, 1827, p. 210.) The 

 tendency is now to identify logic with the analysis of the nature of judgments. 

 "Logik ist Urteilslehre", says Windelband. (Logik, p. 189.) Algebraic or 

 symbolic logic does not concern us in this volume, inasmuch as according 

 to one of its exponents, "natural science is not immediately furthered by 

 the rules of the logical calculus". (A. T. Shearman, "Some Controverted 

 Points in Symbolic Logic", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1905. 

 p. 99.) Earlier classics on the subject are: S.Boole, An Investigation of 

 the Laws of Thought, and De Morgan, Formal Logic. In Principia Mathe- 

 matica, Whitehead and Russell apply the logical calculus to mathematics. 



3 To appreciate the remarkable contrast between pre-scientific naivete and 

 scientific profundity, let the reader compare John Ruskin's conception of the 

 origin of Alpine and English scenery in his Frondes Agrestes, with Lord 



