46 PART I. TEE PROBLEM. 



Any such care on experiments as Francis Bacon bestows, appears to 

 be practically absent in Roger Bacon. His method was apparently urged 

 in self-defence of his views, rather than as an expression of his desire 

 to elaborate a methodology, and his conception of "experience" was, 

 because of his age, primitive in the extreme, and approached therefore 

 that of the scienceless "practical man" rather than that of the modern 

 savant. This appears to be borne out by Mr. Lynn Thorndike's Roger 

 Bacon and the Experimental Method in the Middle Ages : "The collection 

 of facts was another engrossing pursuit [of the Middle Ages], as the vo- 

 luminous mediaeval encyclopedias testify ; there was keen curiosity about 

 the things of this world." (P. 277.) "Bacon's discussion of experimental 

 science, on its positive side, amounts to little more than a recognition of 

 experience as a criterion of truth and promulgation of the phrase 'experi- 

 mental science'." (P. 283.) And Thorndike sums up: "On the whole, one 

 rather gets the impression that the experimental method that Bacon pleads 

 for, as if it were a novelty, is already assumed by other writers as a well- 

 established method." (P. 290.) Having stated so much in criticism, we 

 quote with pleasure a laudatory passage relating to Roger Bacon's con- 

 ception of method. Robert Adamson, in his Roger Bacon (Manchester. 

 1876, pp. 32-33) concludes: "So far as I can gather, the ideal natural phi- 

 losophy, according to Roger Bacon, consisted of the following steps : 

 (1) Application of mathematics to the determination of the simple laws 

 of force ; (2) observation and comparison of the complex phenomena of na- 

 ture; (3) deductive application of the elementary mathematical principles, 

 the laws of force, to the observed phenomena ; (4) experimental verifi- 

 cation of the results deductively obtained." 



According to Charles, whose work is virtually exhaustive, Roger Bacon 

 recognised three ways of reaching truth "1'autorite, qui ne peut produire 

 que la oi, et d'ailleurs doit se justifier aux yeux de la raison; le raison- 

 nement, dont les conclusions les plus certaines laissent a desirer, si on ne 

 les verifie pas; et enfin 1'experience, qui se suffit a elle-meme". (P. 112.) 

 The only passage Charles quotes from Roger Bacon refers to "1'autorite 

 indigne et fragile, 1'empire de la routine, la stupidite du vulgaire, 1'amour- 

 propre des savants, qui leur fait cacher leur ignorance sous 1'etalage d'une 

 science apparente" (p. 99); or in English: "the example of frail and un- 

 worthy authority, long-established custom, the sense of the ignorant crowd, 

 and the hiding of one's own ignorance under the shadow of wisdom". 

 (H. 0. Taylor, op. cit., p. 524.) In fact, Roger Bacon did not pass beyond 

 methodological generalities: "For rules of induction, even faintly analogous 

 to those of the Novum Organum, the student of the Opus Magnum will 

 seek in vain" (J. H. Bridges, op. cit., p. 160), a dictum which is by no 

 means invalidated by the numerous quotations in J.V.Marmery's Progress 

 of Science, 1895. 



Perhaps the following passage from Roger Bacon approaches most nearly 

 the methodological spirit of modern times: "The true method of research, 

 says Bacon in the Compendium studii, 'is to study first what properly 

 conies first in any science, the easier before the more difficult, the general 

 before the particular, the less before the greater. The student's business 

 should lie in chosen and useful topics, because life is short; and these 

 should be set forth with clearness and certitude, which is impossible 

 without experientia. Because, although we know through three means, 

 authority, reason, and experentia, yet authority is not wise unless its reason 

 be given, nor does it give knowledge, but belief. We believe, but do not 

 know, from authority. Nor can reason distinguish sophistry from demon- 

 stration, unless we know that the conclusion is attested by facts. Yet the 

 fruits of study are insignificant at the present time, and the secret and 

 great matters of wisdom are unknown to the crowd of students.'" (H. O. 

 Taylor, op. cit., p. 538.) 



To sum up, Roger Bacon may be considered to have been among the 

 advance guard of his time, as Francis Bacon was of his. The elaboration 

 of a sound methodology was scarcely feasible in Francis Bacon's day when 



