98 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 



be formed. Unfortunately many scholars to-day proceed even 

 further on the downward slope and suppress both the first and 

 the third step, supplying us with a fantastic pell-mell of crude 

 conjectures. It is as if a nation desirous of augmenting its 

 wealth, concentrated its energies on opening for this purpose 

 an endless number of lotteries which offer countless prizes of 

 fabulous value, and deprecated all other activities for the 

 creation of wealth. 



We may now direct our attention to the subject of general- 

 ising which is but another term for hypothetical extension or 

 eduction of statements. 



SECTION XIII. -GENERALISATION OR EXTENSION. 



38. The ideal end of science, on the theoretical side, is 

 to obtain a world formula, or a correlated or integrated series 

 of formula, which shall embrace and suggest all possible 

 general statements. 1 For example, we might arrive at a 

 mechanical or electrical theory of the Universe explaining the 

 physical and chemical properties of matter in terms of elec- 

 trons and their motions. As Bacon, Schopenhauer, Avenarius, 

 Mach, and a host of other thinkers have pointed out, the im- 

 mediate and practical object of generalising is an economic 

 one. 2 The narrowness of the field of consciousness, the slowness 

 marking the communication of ideas, and the quick fading and 

 deterioration of memories, lead to the desire to epitomise our 

 knowledge. 



1 "The ideal of knowledge, no doubt, is ... in the progressive reduction 

 of reality to a single system or to comprehensive single systems." (Bosan- 

 quet, Logic, vol. 2, p. 174.) "Every great advance in science consists in a 

 great generalisation, pointing out deep and subtle resemblances." (Jevons, 

 Principles of Science, p. 625.) "Legitimate generalisation is the end and 

 aim of all philosophy." (Mill, Logic.) 



2 "It is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of 

 individual experience." (Bacon, Advancement of Learning, bk. 2.) 



"To diminish, as far as possible, the number of general laws necessary 

 for the positive explanation of natural phenomena ... is the real philosophic 

 purpose of all science." (Comte, The Fundamental Principles of the Positive 

 Philosophy, ed. 1905, p. 41.) 



"The amount of our knowledge depends upon our power of bringing it 

 within practicable compass. Unless we arrange and classify facts and con- 

 dense them into general truths, they soon surpass our powers of memory 

 and serve but to confuse." (Jevons, Principles of Science, pp. 148-149.) 



For an able statement, see Section 4 of Ch. 4, entitled "The Economy of 

 Science", in Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics, 1902. 



"Science has been termed an economy of thought, a shorthand of know- 

 ledge, a simplified view of things, a compressed formulation of facts, a brief 

 statement of what is observable, and the like. If this very plausible stand- 

 point be correct, we have in it a striking illustration of the principle of 

 economisation. According to our reading of the facts the following happens 

 in the evolution of truths. Surrounded by innumerable interesting things 

 of most varying aspects, we try hard to comprehend them. Since little 

 time is at our disposal, we make desperate attempts to reach the simplest 



