102 PART II. SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL TERMS. 



Moreover, the difficulty in generalising not infrequently lies 

 in the fact that generalising is inappropriate in multitudes of 

 cases. It is not always true, for instance, that whenever one 

 man imputes to another man certain motives, he reflects what 

 would be his own motives in such circumstances. On the con- 

 trary, and this is for us the determining factor to remember, 

 it is often true that men's reasons for ascribing motives to 

 others vary much, and it is not improbable that my acquaint- 

 ance had only yesterday and to-day acted in the manner 

 indicated, and that he would not again act thus. 1 Let any one 

 attempt to generalise mechanically: This book is well written, 

 therefore all books are well written; this residence is large, 

 therefore all residences are large ; Irene is fifteen years old to- 

 day, therefore everybody is fifteen years old to-day; "from 

 the age of zero to the age of one year the child is able to 

 increase its weight 200 /o" (S. Minot, op. cit, p. 109), therefore 

 we ^ach increase our weight each year by 200 /o; the blue 

 rays are most efficient for the heliotropic reactions of certain 

 plants, and the yellowish-green rays for the heliotropic reactions 

 of certain animals, yet these facts cannot be generalised; or, 

 since the fertilised ovum increases a billionfold in size within 

 nine months, therefore we increase a billionfold in size every 

 nine months ; and he will appreciate the limitations to mechani- 

 cal generalising. 2 From every point of view, then, we infer 

 that there is nothing rounded about a generalisation; that it 

 is not always justifiable to generalise; -that there is no dividing 

 line between an extension of one particular to one other or to 

 a comprehensive class ; and that it is often expedient to refrain 

 from generalising, to extend only to a second circumstance or 

 to several circumstances, and so on ad indefinitum. When to 

 generalise, 3 and to what extent to generalise, is in the present 

 day a matter of capricious habit, but will be in futurity a 

 question of science. (See on this point Conclusion 25 1.) 



We thus comprehend why men resort to a universalised 

 form of speech. "In common discourse", Isaac Watts judi- 

 ciously remarks, "we usually denominate persons and things 

 according to the major part of their character. He is to be 

 called a wise man who has but few follies ; he is a good philo- 



1 As Darwin incisively expressed this: '"Any fool can generalise and 

 speculate.' " (Frank Cramer, op. cit., p. 39.) 



2 Dictionary makers frequently generalise mechanically. Thus one dic- 

 tionary gives as part of the definition of "Swiss" "the language of Switzer- 

 land", and another dictionary, "its language", when, of course, there is no 

 "Swiss language". 



"Where we observe the same mark in different subjects, we are pre- 

 disposed to think that the agreement is not a chance one and that the 

 different subjects have not therefore stumbled upon the same predicate 

 each through a special circumstance of its own, but are all radically of one 

 common essence, of which their possession of the same mark is the con- 

 sequence." (Lotze, Logic, vol. 1, p. 134.) 



