SECTION 17. INDUCTION. 133 



elude, according to our examination, the process of perceiving 

 objects, that of observing and experimenting with or without 

 instruments, that of generalising, and, finally, that of verifying 

 and exhausting our generalisations through deductive procedure 

 and otherwise. We could not adopt another definition of Mill's 

 which conceives induction to be conterminous with generali- 

 sation, as when he states: "Induction is the process by which 

 we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class 

 is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times 

 will be true in similar circumstances at all times" 1 (ibid., bk. 3, 

 ch. 2, 1); but we do appreciate the fact that generalising or 

 induction, as Mill names it if it be guarded and yet not defi- 

 cient in daring, is relatively the most useful, because most 

 far-reaching, portion of the process of induction. The first 

 definition prevents the confounding of the two terms Generali- 

 sation and Induction, and assigns a distinctive meaning to 

 each of those terms ; yet even this definition is not sufficiently 

 comprehensive, since it is not identical with an enquiry as 

 such. 



It is difficult to define truly the process of induction, save 

 perhaps by such an ambiguous phrase, as that Induction sums 

 up the general method of procedure in modern science.- The 

 pre-scientific practice was to draw conclusions from insufficient 



1 In Mill's opinion induction implies an inference from certain particulars 

 to a class. For this reason, when all the particulars are given, we have, 

 according to him, "Inductions improperly so called''. He thus identifies in- 

 duction with the more common form of generalising, and leaves no term 

 to denominate the scientific process as such. 



2 Induction is "a kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole class, 

 what has been ascertained respecting one or more individuals of that class". 

 (Whately, Logic, p. 344.) 



"The contrast of the deductive and inductive process is obvious. In the 

 former, we proceed at each step from general truths to particular applications 

 of them ; in the latter, from particular observations to a general truth which 

 includes them." (Whewell, History of Scientific Ideas, vol. 1, p. 28.) ''Each 

 induction supplies the materials of fresh inductions, each generalisation, 

 with all that it embraces in its circle, may be found to be but one of many 

 circles, comprehended within the circuit of some wider generalisation." tfbid., 

 p. 50.) "The process of induction may be resolved into three steps: the 

 selection of the idea, the construction of the conception, arid the determi- 

 nation of the magnitudes." (Novum Organon Renovatum, p. 186.) 



"Induction is the arriving at general propositions, by means of Obser- 

 vation or Fact." (Bain, Logic, vol.2, p. 111.) "Induction so-called is merely 

 a certain collection of particulars, with generalised expression superadded; 

 deduction is the bringing in of new particulars." (Ibid., p. 419.) 



"There are but three steps in the process of induction: (1) Framing some 

 hypothesis as to the character of the general law. (2) Deducing consequences 

 from that law. (3) Observing whether the consequences agree with the parti- 

 cular facts under consideration." (Jevons, Principles of Science, pp. 265-266.) 

 "In all cases of inductive inference we must invent hypotheses, until we 

 fall upon some hypothesis which yields deductive results in accordance 

 with experience." (Ibid., p. 228.) 



"Every process of induction and deduction may be broadly described as 

 a cognition and a recognition." (Naden, Induction and Deduction, p. 92.) 



