170 PART IV. PREPARATORY STAGE. 



now be conceived as a solemn duty. And, indubitably, the more 

 the theoretical and practical sciences will develop, the more 

 peremptory will be the methodological demand that he who 

 is well versed in theoretical science shall not fail to apply his 

 knowledge to improving life along the line of his studies. In 

 fact, we ought to be prepared for a somewhat startling develop- 

 ment resulting from the closer contact of science and life. We 

 mean that he who is primarily concerned with the life of 

 practice should, noblesse oblige, aim also, both incidentally and 

 systematically, at enriching the realm of theory. In this way 

 the concurrent development of science and practice will lead 

 to their rendering each other invaluable services and even- 

 tually coalescing. 



We approach now another aspect. Division of labour was 

 one of the earliest phenomena characterising advance in civili- 

 sation. Almost all the ancient cultures possessed the caste 

 system. There was the ruling caste, the warrior caste, the 

 priestly caste, the merchant caste, and the labouring caste. 

 By such a division of labour, rigorously enforced, efficiency 

 in a number of directions was ensured. However, the desire 

 for increased efficiency led ultimately to the formation of 

 countless sub-castes or classes. Hence the classical economists 

 fondly dwelt on, and insistently counselled, the minutest sub- 

 division of labour. Consequently, the ideal appeared to them 

 that a factory should turn out, for instance, only needles, only 

 screws, and so on. 



The process of scientific development followed the same lines. 

 Thinkers of the olden time, as among the ancient Greeks or 

 Hindoos, took all or most knowledge as their province. As, 

 however, the centuries passed, and material and difficulties 

 accumulated, division of labour was gradually introduced. This 

 process became in time more intensive. Single sciences divided 

 and sub-divided themselves, and the range of interest of men 

 of science assumed insignificant dimensions compared with that 

 of the earliest searchers after scientific truth. So manifold 

 and embarrassing appeared the objective difficulties that speciali- 

 sation was carried to the point of the investigator concerning 

 himself only with a microscopic portion of a subject. In this 

 way alone, it was held, could science securely advance. The 

 historic process, as above depicted, was its own justification, 

 since necessity was its cause. 



Then the theory became popular that specialisation in science 

 was inevitable, and that save for specialisation, and the minutest 

 specialisation, there could be no advance in science. Reality, 

 it was contended, -was many-sided and full-blooded, and science 

 a pale, almost featureless, abstraction. Things were complex, 

 but science, it was asserted, could only recognise the separate 

 constituents of these complexes. Truth and scientific truth 

 were regarded as being poles asunder. Inasmuch, however, 



