240 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 



of physical force has literally not arisen for these territorial 

 groups. From this and cognate considerations we may infer 

 that mobile individuals and immobile territorial groups belong 

 to two fundamentally different categories: the one, in modern 

 times, inconceivable without a police, the other capable of 

 existing for centuries, and presumably indefinitely, without 

 even the threat of physical force. An examination of the 

 differences between an individual and territorial groups would 

 show why this is so ; but this would lead us beyond the limits 

 of the present Conclusion. Suffice it that since physical force 

 is, one may almost say, never contemplated in intra-territorial 

 questions, its use in inter-territorial difficulties may be con- 

 ceived as equally unnecessary. Shifting the problem from the 

 margin into the focus, we discover that we are confronted with 

 two astounding, but exceedingly plausible, fallacies. A new 

 formulation hence ensues: "If physical force is not needed 

 in the governance of intra-territorial groups, is it indispensable 

 in the relations of sovereign territorial groups?" Here, too, 

 the historic and evolutionary method including as it does 

 past, present, and probable future should be applied. 



What, again, shall we say to the suggestion that the arma- 

 ments of the nations should be limited ? Once more we have a 

 popular demand, universally deemed reasonable and feasible. 

 The essential implication in this instance is that armaments are 

 a definite quantity which can be mechanically reduced. A 

 hundred years ago, when inventions played an insignificant part 

 in war and peace, there could have been no grave logical 

 objection to this demand. Is this, however, so to-day ? Think 

 of the World War! Germany's first successes in Belgium and 

 France, and the great Russian "drive", were principally due to 

 the unexpected quantity of ammunition and machine guns used, 

 and to the influence of the unanticipated German and Austrian 

 monster guns. Moreover, the U-boat and its fiendish method, 

 as well as poison gas and other potent factors, were novel to 

 the world. Accordingly, if an Armaments Limitation Agreement 

 had existed before the war, it would have almost certainly not 

 provided for these unexpected instrumentalities, and would 

 have therefore left Germany in a highly advantageous military 

 position. It is hence likely that an Armaments Limitation 

 Agreement concluded now, would be very largely obsolete in 

 a decade or less, and prove perilous to nations relying thereon, 

 especially in view of the experience gained during the war and 

 the harnessing of science to the car of international slaughter. 

 Once more, a clear statement of the problem would have shattered 

 a fallacy which Is at present almost ubiquitously diffused. 



Or, consider the enthusiasm engendered after the termination 

 of the World War by the proposal to form a League of Nations. 

 "We must have a League of Nations", was the cry of all parties, 

 save of the small ultra-militarist group. Yet what precisely is 



