272 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 



(h) Grow accustomed to meet any difficulty by any convenient and 



lawful means. 



(/) If one condition e.g., a particular time, place, degree, size, number, 

 environment, connection, etc.,-is not satisfactory, probably another will 

 be. (Example: 10" o'clock or 12 o'clock will probably do for an appointment 

 as well as 11 o'clock.) 



(/) If one means or object is not satisfactory, probably another will be. 



(A) Define the problem in the largest term, e.g., something to resolve 

 or to fasten, some habit or receptacle, something to be made sure of or 

 secure, some attractive or heavy object and then seek its solution. (Ex- 

 ample: if a certain receptacle is inaccessible, another, never mind its 

 form, size, or ordinary use, may be at our disposal.) 



(/) When you cannot obtain an object one way, try another and other 

 ways, and endeavour also to remember other, and others', ways. 



(m) Assume that virtually everything can be accomplished, and that 

 it can be accomplished in more ways than one, and better. 



(n) Even if one way will effect your purpose, essay other ways for 

 practice and delight. 



(o) Undergo a course of training in resourcefulness, and periodically 

 experiment systematically and on an extensive scale by yourself. 



136. (q) Graded, Comprehensive, Important, Full, Rational 

 and Relevant, Original, Automatically Initiated, and Methodi- 

 cally Developed Observation. Conclusion 25 deals indirectly, 

 but amply, with these aspects of observation, so far as they 

 are not already touched on in this Conclusion. We therefore 

 refrain from illustrating the latter in this place. 



Lotze has many excellent remarks concerning observation; but he 

 scarcely meets the points mentioned in the above Conclusion. As to wide 

 observation, for instance, he only states: "The individual subjects from 

 the observation of which we start must be very numerous." (Logic, 

 vol. 2, p. 33.) Bain vaguely refers to "wide comparison of particulars". 

 (Logic, vol. 2, p. 403.) It is poor consolation when he adds: "The pre- 

 cautions common to all kinds of observation, in regard to accuracy and 

 evidence, would be worthy of being recited, provided there could be given 

 a sufficiency of illustrative instances to make the desired impression." 

 (Ibid., p. 414.) If, as Jevons (Principles of Science, p. 399) says, "all know- 

 ledge proceeds originally from experience", then no effort can be too 

 sustained to make sure that the raw material of thought shall be of an 

 irreproachable character. Whewell also expresses himself prophetically: 

 "Methods of observation and of induction might of themselves form an 

 abundant subject for a treatise, and hereafter will probably do so, in the 

 hands of future writers." (Novum Organum Renovatum, p. 144.) Mill 

 asserts: "It would be possible to point out what qualities of mind, and 

 modes of mental culture fit a person for being a good observer: that, 

 however, is a question not of Logic, but of the Theory of Education, in' 

 the most enlarged sense of the term. There is not properly an Art of 

 Observing. There may be rules for observing. But these, like rules for 

 inventing, are properly instructions for the preparation of one's own mind ; 

 for putting it into the state in which it will be most fitted to observe, 

 or most likely to invent. They are, therefore, essentially rules of self- 

 education, which is a different thing from Logic. They do not teach how 

 to do the thing, but how to make ourselves capable of doing it. They 



answer required. Direct protection of the ears from aggressive sounds, it 

 appears, should rather be aimed at. (The author has empirically, and some- 

 what crudely, solved the problem for himself by covering both his ears 

 with his bed pillow in going to sleep and in the early morning when dis- 

 turbed.) 



