288 PART V. WORKING STAGE. 



of culture, the implications of these terms deviate definitely 

 from generation to generation! And this impossible view is 

 further complicated by the theory that genius, like murder, will 

 out, portraying a perfect social Babel where we find historically 

 almost uninterrupted change and progress along a certain line. 

 We have accordingly, to select an illustration, to imagine some 

 genius born who "invents" unison music, another part music, 

 another melody accompanied by a theme, another a musical 

 theme without melody, and others more and more intricate 

 themes, and practically never a genius appearing out of order. 

 When we, therefore, consider the slow and orderly transforma- 

 tions historically undergone by the human arts, crafts, and dis- 

 ciplines, and the instruments they employ, it seems inexpres- 

 sibly inept to propound the thesis that any one is born to 

 accomplish a certain cultural task. The attempt reminds one 

 of nothing so much as of square circles and round triangles. 

 Here, however, the scientific imagination ends, and the demand 

 arises for an ascertainment of the precise facts and factors 

 involved. 



Similarly with scores of catchwords in those spheres of cogni- 

 tion where the method of cool and full analysis is in sharp 

 conflict with the courses of action proposed by passion and 

 prejudice : everywhere these catchwords would be either rejected 

 or would acquire fuller significance. Want of thought, more 

 than scantiness of facts, is therefore not infrequently the cause 

 of erroneous arguments and conclusions. 



Active memory or imagination has thus its place in science ; 

 but it is rigorously limited in scope. If the particular fact under 

 consideration at any time has not been thoroughly examined, 

 or if the general facts are not familiar, imagination will be a 

 busy mischief-maker. Scientific imagination is therefore con- 

 cerned with what is securely established, and only aims at 

 mentally reviewing the possibilities of extending a truth where 

 it is not a question of generalising intimately known and already 

 classified facts. The almost preternaturally slow advance of 

 the knowledge of rays and of electric phenomena during the 

 last fifty years, in spite of hosts of well-prepared intellects 

 examining the phenomena, illustrates our contention that as a 

 rule the scientific imagination does not roam, but tramps round 

 and round a small and well-defined area. Only when prodigious 

 masses of facts and generalisations have been collected, collated, 

 and fused, is there room for a Newton, a Laplace, or a Darwin, 

 to propose sweeping truths, or for a Sophocles or Corneille 

 to write divinely. Here also the imagination is constrained 

 to travel in certain prescribed narrow paths, decided by the 

 countless established details and generalisations. The working 

 hypotheses in the sciences form no exception to this statement, 

 for they endeavour to interpret new facts by old facts, not 

 new facts by novel or ancient fancies. 



