SECTION 26. DEDUCTION. 379 



7. And this involves that the reputed moral contribution of 

 a Socrates or a Buddha consists, for all intents and purposes, 

 of a portion of that part of the collected store of moral wisdom 

 which was at his disposal in his circumstances. 



8. And, further, that save for the collected store, other circum- 

 stances being equal, a Socrates or a Buddha would, according 

 to 3 and 5, exhibit a wholly inappreciable amount of moral 

 culture, below that of the most neglected Australian aboriginal. 



9. Again. Applying 8 to our day, and taking any examples 

 of the two extremes, it would follow that, save for external 

 circumstances, the difference between the moral culture pos- 

 sessed by them would be indifferent. 



10. Thinking now of the realm of practice according to Con- 

 clusion 31, and for this purpose assuming ideal circumstances, 

 in conformity with Conclusion 20, every individual might be a 

 Socrates or a Buddha, even greatly surpassing both in moral 

 excellence, and every individual might strive to resemble them. 



11. Finally, to conclude with a definition according to Con- 

 clusion 15, from the preceding it follows that the unit of the 

 moral contribution of an individual may be measured approxi- 

 mately by the moral contribution of the culturally most neglected 

 individual of the most primitive community extant to-day or 

 historically recorded. Etc., etc. 



If we choose, we may pursue our examination by breaking 

 up the word "moral" into the cardinal virtues Justice, Temper- 

 ance, Prudence, and Courage, and proceed, as above, first, for 

 instance, with the analysis of the term Justice. 



We might then break up the word Justice, and proceed 

 with the first constituent as above. 



Etc., etc. 



Inspecting now our deduced propositions, we note that we 

 had deliberately dealt only with the individual. Following re- 

 cognised classifications, we systematically extend our deductions 

 to sex, family, class, stock, people, nation, sub-race, and race. 



Culture being pan-human, we infer, then, that what we 

 affirmed of the individual in regard to his moral contribution, 

 holds, mutatis mutandis, of sexes, families, classes, stocks, 

 peoples, nations, and races. That is, each has congenially the 

 same status as its congeners. 



Summing up, according to Conclusion 34, we may state that, 

 save for varying external circumstances, the moral, intellectual, 

 hygienic, aesthetic, and other cultural contributions of any one 

 individual, sex, family, class, stock, people, nation, sub-race, 

 and race are equal to those of any other individual, sex, 

 family, class, stock, people, nation, sub-race, and race, and the 

 highest conceivable condition of perfection is attainable by all, 

 and should be aimed at both individually and collectively, in 

 conformity with varying external circumstances. 



Etc., etc., with the eleven points. 



