428 



INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 



ment and goal, 33; scientific train- 

 ing dependent on a scientific , 

 - should be introduced without 

 delay, 34; in colleges, 34; thought 

 as habit-controlled and as pan- 

 human, 34-36; correct thinking 

 dependent on historically developed 

 , and not on new or rare mental 

 powers, 38 ; the progress of methodo- 

 logical theory, 38-53; syllogism 

 (see) ; symbolic logic (see) ; verbal 

 clearness and consistency first 

 demand, then methods of discovery, 

 41-42 ; methods applied by Bacon 

 in the discovery of the nature of 

 heat, 42-43; Bacon's method, and 

 why it is neglected, 43-44; the 

 skeleton of his method adopted 

 through Mill, 44; either return to 

 Bacon or transcend him, 44; Her- 

 schel's summary of Bacon's method, 

 45; trains of reasoning even less 

 reliable than the perceptions of the 

 senses, 47; Bacon and Descartes 

 respectively over-emphasised in- 

 duction and deduction, 47; proof, 

 not discovery, is the object of the 

 old logic, 48 ; certainty rarely attain- 

 able, nor usually to be sought for, 

 50; Mill on superior minds and on 

 instinct, 52; scientists both observe 

 and generalise, 52 ; Whewell, Jevons, 

 and Mill, as methodologists, 53; 

 relativist logic as the mistress of 

 the sciences, 53; alleged influence 

 of the unconscious, 63; conviction 

 that scientific method alone leads 

 to truth, 64-65; a bold guess and 

 verification favoured by logicians, 

 77; place and growth of scientific 

 experiment and observation, 84-85; 

 facts should be studied both stati- 

 cally and dynamically, 87; syn- 

 thetic , 88; logicians mostly over- 

 stress the importance of hypotheses, 

 89 ; Mill would apply his hypotheti- 

 cal method in social science, and 

 other scholars drop verification as 

 well as observation, 97-98 ; position 

 of complete or perfect inductions, 

 106-108, 134; mankind is interested 

 in new truths, 108; law of averages, 

 109; scientific verification and proof 

 generally ignored in the cultural 

 sciences, 115-117; danger of un- 

 scientific theories, 122, 159; in- 

 dividual investigations should ex- 

 tend to a life-time, 129, 180-181, 

 329, 330, 333, 406; a science com- 

 mences in perplexing indefiniteness 

 and tends to terminate in dogmatic 



definiteness, 129; precision in gene- 

 ral statements of utmost value, 

 129-130; Bacon's case for a , 141; 

 methodological canons are fre- 

 quently ignored, 142; Bacon, Des- 

 cartes, Kant, Darwin, Bain, Spinoza, 

 Leibniz, Comte, and Huxley on the 

 conduct of the understanding, 145- 

 147; the expert thinker, the end 

 of an enquiry, the object, scope, 

 and aim of a scientific , 148; 

 main injunctions focused in a 

 sentence, 149; methodological pro- 

 gress best summed in Aristotle and 

 Bacon, 149; present-day methodo- 

 logical practice, 150-155; what an 

 ideal would do, 150; the in- 

 vestigator of the distant future, 

 153-154 ; need of recognition that 

 procedure should be determined 

 methodologically, 154-163; plan of 

 synthetic , 163-166 ; two reserva- 

 tions, 165-166; a historic appre- 

 ciation of differences in methods 

 and in the scope of enquiries, 166- 

 174; difference between a Pliny or 

 a scholastic and a modern observer 

 due to growth in positive know- 

 ledge and in sounder methods, 167; 

 sciences follow each other accord- 

 ing to the degree of their com- 

 plexity, 168-169; science and life 

 increasingly approach each other, 

 169 ; practical workers promoting 

 pure science, 170; comprehensive 

 and synthetic enquiries becoming 

 possible, 172-174, and when in- 

 admissible, 174; general nature and 

 relations of phenomena, 174-179; 

 introductory category, 175 ; primary 

 categories (material modal, and pro- 

 cedure aspects), 175-179 ; secondary 

 categories, 179-180; salient prob- 

 lems of the age preferably to be 

 attacked, 180; inquirer's suitability, 

 181 ; simple starting-point a pre- 

 requisite, 181-185 ; the order of 

 fruitful investigation, 184, and per- 

 tinent rules, 184-185, 189; vagueness 

 and over-subtlety to be avoided, 

 185-189; a satisfactory solution 

 reached by a series of approxima- 

 tions, 188; individual's investigation 

 has only contributory value, 189- 

 235 ; formal rules barren, 190 ; far- 

 reaching effects of psychical pre- 

 judice, 190-193; Descartes, Kant, 

 Mill, and Comte, their emphatic 

 opinions, 190-191 ; psychical pre- 

 judices within the methodological 

 process itself, 193; recognised 



