512 A MANUAL OF VETERINARY PHYSIOLOGY 



perform the antics of a foal, and imitation amongst them is so 

 great that, if one of a string of horses being led along happens to 

 kick out, this repeats itself all along the line as if by preconceived 

 arrangement. 



Sydney Smith defined the difference between reason and 

 instinct as follows : ' If, in order to do a certain thing, certain 

 means are adopted to effect it, with a clear and precise notion 

 that these means are subservient to that end, the act is one of 

 reason ; if, on the other hand, means are adopted subservient 

 to an end, without there being the least degree of consciousness 

 that these means are subservient to the end, then the act is one 

 of instinct/ Morgan* believes that between instinct on the one 

 hand, and reason on the other, we may insert as a middle term 

 ' intelligence,' while Romanes and others use the word ' in- 

 telligence ' as synonymous with ' reason.' Morgan defines 

 instinct as a motor response to a certain stimulus — i.e., a reflex 

 act, but one accompanied by consciousness. Animals come into 

 the world endowed with this innate capacity for motor response ; 

 but these instincts are not quite perfect ; they need training and 

 experience, and their instructor is ' intelligence.' Intelligence, 

 according to this observer, does not imply a conscious knowledge 

 of the relation between the means employed and the end attained ; 

 such a conscious knowledge would be reason. In other words 

 we are asked to regard animals as simply reflex machines, their 

 brain being very little higher in the scale than their spinal cord, 

 and for some such a position meets the case, but certainly not 

 for all. If we accept Morgan's definition of instinct and intelli- 

 gence, it offers no reasonable explanation of why dogs fight, and 

 why they worry cats ; why a horse so inclined will turn his 

 quarters towards another as he passes, and rapidly let both 

 hind-legs fly in the direction of his objective ; nor will 

 it explain why a horse will use his fore-legs to strike when 

 he knows his hind-legs cannot reach the object of his irrita- 

 tion. It fails completely to explain why an elephant employed 

 piling timber, with human precision, refuses to work one 

 minute beyond the allotted hours. Nor can we believe that 

 the extraordinary sense shown by a sheep-dog is not directed 

 by reason. It is absolutely impossible to believe that such acts 

 imply no conscious knowledge of the relation between the means 

 employed and the end attained. 



The higher animals are capable of a limited amount of reason- 

 ing ; with some it is even relatively well developed, with others it 

 is extremely imperfect. The elephant and dog occupy the top 

 of the scale, the ox and sheep the bottom, the horse comes mid- 



* Fortnightly Review, August, 1893. 



