522 OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM AND ITS ACTIONS. 



voluntary imitation is much stronger in some individuals than in others. 

 On the other hand, imitative actions may be voluntarily performed, as 

 the result of a desire to execute them, which involves a distinct idea of 

 the object ; and the moving force of this desire is derived from the 

 pleasure which the individual derives from the performance, and which 

 he finds either in the act itself, or in the enjoyment which it affords to 

 others, or in its prospective benefits (pecuniary or otherwise) to himself. 

 Thus we see that the Mind (properly so called) is concerned in all Emo- 

 tional actions; whilst there is no evidence of the participation of any higher 

 attribute than sensation in the purely Instinctive acts ; and even this is 

 not a requisite link in the chain, by which many of the movements are 

 excited, that are usually grouped together under that designation. 



919. Again, the Emotions may be excited by operations of the Mind 

 itself, as well as by sensations immediately received from without. 

 Thus, involuntary laughter may result from a ludicrous idea, called up 

 by some train of association, and having no obvious connexion with the 

 sensation which first set this process in operation ; and the various move- 

 ments of the face and person by which Actors endeavour to express strong 

 emotions, are most effectual in conveying their meaning, when they result 

 from the actual working of the emotions in the mind of the performer, 

 who has, by an effort of the will, identified himself (so to speak) with 

 the character he personates. A still more remarkable case is that in 

 which paroxysms of Hysterical convulsion, in themselves beyond the 

 power of the Will to excite or to control, are brought on by a voluntary 

 effort ; this being exerted, not in the attempts to perform the move- 

 ments, but in " getting up," so to speak, the state of feeling, from 

 which, when it is once excited, the movements spontaneously flow. In 

 all these instances, and others of like nature, it would seem as if the 

 agency of the Cerebrum produced the same condition in the Automatic 

 centres, as that which is more directly excited by sensations received 

 through their own afferent nerves. But on the other hand, the Emo- 

 tions, by their influence on the Reasoning processes, are largely con- 

 cerned in many actions which are strictly voluntary ; in fact it may be 

 questioned whether there are any of our actions, the power necessary for 

 whose performance is not derived, directly or indirectly, from emotional 

 states of mind ; all our motives to any kind of exertion being found, if care- 

 fully analyzed, to have reference to pleasure to be derived, or pain to be 

 avoided, either in the very performance of the action, or in the conse- 

 quences which our reasoning processes connect with it. And it will be 

 found that the difference between those persons who are said to act from 

 feeling, and those who are said to be guided by reason, is not precisely 

 what these terms imply ; for the actions of both are equally determined 

 by the motives supplied by emotional states ; and the difference rather 

 lies in this, that one class act on their first impulses without considering 

 the consequences, whilst the other calculate the remoter results, and 

 weigh the future pain against the present pleasure the ultimate enjoy- 

 ment against the immediate distress. The Emotional states are pecu- 

 liarly liable to be influenced by the condition of the corporeal system ; 

 thus a very slight depravation of the blood may produce an irresistible 

 tendency to take a gloomy view of everything to which the mind may 



