INTRODUCTION 5 



a criterion of what we may term effective consciousness. 

 There may be sentience which is merely an accompaniment 

 of organic action without any guiding influence on subse- 

 quent modes of behavior. In that case it is not effective; 

 and whether it is present or not we have no means of ascer- 

 taining." 



It may be argued that since learning in us is a conscious 

 process that therefore all animals that learn are likewise 

 conscious. The inference may be probable, though by no 

 means necessary; but it would afford no ground for denying 

 consciousness in animals in which learning does not occur. 

 If I am pricked by a needle I am acutely conscious. The 

 feeling of pain is aroused very directly, and it is difficult to see 

 how it can be dependent in any way on associative memory. 

 If my memory should fail me to the extent that I would 

 straightway forget the experience every time I was pricked 

 would not the pricking arouse the same painful sensation 

 as before? Would not sound waves produce the sensation 

 of hearing and retinal stimulation the sensation of light in 

 the absence of any power of recalling similar sensations 

 received in the past? Unless it can be shown that there is 

 some relation of dependence of consciousness upon associa- 

 tive memory in ourselves there is little ground for setting 

 up associative memory as a criterion of consciousness in 

 animals. The criterion reverses the obvious relation of 

 the phenomena. Instead of consciousness being dependent 

 upon associative memory, associative memory implies the 

 previous existence of consciousness. How can the exist- 

 ence of anything be dependent on the association of its 

 elements, if these elements can exist only on the condition 

 that they are associated? The criterion makes the exist- 

 ence of the more simple and general dependent on the exist- 

 ence of a special function within its own realm. 



