5<^ OF REPRODUCTION 



for it belongs not to a general caufe. Neither 

 is it folely a queftion of fad : And if we can 

 conceive a method of reprodudlion, depending 

 on primary caufes, or which, at leaf!:, is not re- 

 pugnant to them, we ought to be fatisfied with 

 it ; and the more relation it has to the other ef- 

 fects of Nature, it will reft upon a firmer bafis. 

 By the nature of the queftion, then, we are 

 permitted to form hypothefes, and to choofe that 

 which appears tohavethegreateft analogy to the 

 other phaenomena of nature. But we ought to 

 rejedl every hypothefis which fuppofes the thing 

 to be already accomplifhed ; fuch, for example, 

 as that which fuppofes the firft germ to contain 

 all the germs of the fame fpecies, or that every 

 reproduction is a new creation, an immediate 

 cfted: of the will of the Deity; for all hypo- 

 thefes of this kind are mere matters of fad:, con- 

 cerning which it is impoflible to reafon. We 

 muft likewife rejedt every hypothefis which is 

 founded on final caufes, fuch as, that reproduc- 

 tion is ordained in order to replace the living 

 for the dead; that the earth may always be co- 

 vered with vegeuiblesand peopled with animals ; 

 that men may be fupplied with abundance of 

 nourifhment, &c.; for fuch hypothefes, in place 

 of explaining the effed: by phyfical caufes, ftand 

 on no other foundation than arbitrary relation^ 

 and moral affinities. We ought, at the fame 

 time, to defpife thofe general axioms and phy- 

 sical problems fo frequently and fo injudiciouf- 



