OF MAN. 2>57 



May we not hence conclude, that the caiifes of 

 our feniations neccfTarily differ from our notions 

 concerning them ? That extcnfion which we 

 perceive by the eye, that impenetrabiHty of 

 which we acquire the idea by touching, and all 

 the other conllituent properties of matter, may 

 have no exiftence; fmce our internal fenfations 

 ofextenfion, impenetrabihty, &c. are neither ex- 

 tended nor impenetrable, and poflefs nothing 

 in common with thefe qualities. 



As the mind, during fleep, is affedled with 

 fenfations which are often different from thofe 

 excited by the adual preience of the objeds, 

 is it not natural to think, that the prefence of 

 objects is not neceffary to the exiftence of our 

 fenfations, and, confequcntly, that both mind 

 and body may exift independent of thefe objedts ? 

 For, during fleep and after death, the body has 

 the fame exiftence as before, though the mind 

 recognifes not this exiftence, and, with regard to 

 us, the body entirely lofcs its being. Now I ail^, 

 if any objed that can exift, and afterwards be 

 no more, which afl'ed:s us in a manner totally 

 different from what it is, and from what it Jias 

 been, can be fo real as to leave no doubt of its 

 exiftence ? 



We may ftlll, however, bcHeve, though we 

 are uncertain, that fomething exifts without us ; 

 but we cannot hefitate concerning the real ex- 

 iftence of every thing within us. The exiftence 

 of the foul, therefore, is certain, and that of the 



Z 3 body- 



