3^0 OF THE NATURE 



the idea of motion is inconceivable. The will, 

 therefore, if it be a motion, is not a material 

 motion ; and, if the union of the mind with its 

 objed be a contact, it muft be a contad, or ra- 

 ther an intimate penetration, at a diftance! qua- 

 lities which are the reverfe of thofe of matter, 

 and which, of courfe, can belong only to an 

 immaterial being. 



But I am apprehenfive of having dwelt too 

 long upon a fubjeft, which, by fome, may be 

 regarded as foreign to the nature of this work. 

 What connexion, it rmiy be faid, have metaphy- 

 fical remarks on the mind with natural hiftory ? 

 If I were confcious of abilities fufficient for the 

 difcuffion of a topic fo elevated and extenfivc, 

 this refledion, I acknowledge, would not give 

 me any uneafmefs ; and I have abridged my 

 obfervations, folcly becaufe I defpaired of being 

 able to comprehend a fubjedi fo immenfe, and 

 fo important in its r.atiire. Why fhouid the 

 nobleil: part of man be rejeded from his hifiory ? 

 Why tlius prepofterouily dehafc him, by confi- 

 dering him merely as an animal, while his na- 

 ture is fo different, and fo iuperior to that of the 

 brutes, that nothing but the mod brutal igno- 

 rance could ever dream of confounding them ? 



Man, it is true, refembles the other animals 

 in the material part of his being ; and, in the 

 enumeration of natural exigences, w^e are obliged 

 10 rank him in the clafs of animals. But, in 

 {nature, there are neither claffes nor genera ; all 



are 



