340 Morality and Self-interest 



stated the doctrine in its international fonn as 

 follows : 



Some good men seem inclined to maintain that the 

 action of a state towards other states ought to be the 

 same as the action of an individual towards other 

 individuals. But this contains a fallacy which, one 

 might think, it should not be difficult to discern. We 

 personify a state, but a state is not a person. It con- 

 tains a vast number of persons, and those who speak 

 in its name and determine its policy act not for them- 

 selves but for others. It follows that all that depart- 

 ment of morality which requires an individual to 

 sacrifice himself to others, everything which falls 

 under the heading of unselfishness, is inappropriate 

 to the action of a state. No one has a right to be 

 unselfish with other peoples' interests. It is the busi- 

 ness of every ruler to exact to the utmost every claim 

 which can both justly and wisely be made on behalf of 

 his country. He is in the position of a trustee of the 

 interests of others and must be just and not generous.* 



This idea of the essential opposition between 

 morality and the highest interest of the individual 

 or the nation, characterizes the philosophy of force 

 in all countries. Prof. R. Broda sums up Bis- 

 marck's attitude thus: 



Bismarck declared that a powerful nation could not 

 bind itself to a sentimental policy, but that it ought to 

 obey solely its own interests, in other words that it is 

 necessary to put aside all those things which individuals 



' Lord Hugh Cecil, " Conservatism," pp. 200-202. 



