NECESSITY OF AN ANALYSIS OP NAMES. 13 



(as the phrase is) predicated : the eartJi, words denoting the object 

 which that quaUty is affirmed of, compose the Subject; the word is, 

 which serves as the connecting mark between the subject and predi- 

 cate, to show that one of them is affirmed of the other, is called the 

 Copula. 



Dismissing, for the present, the copula, of which more will be said 

 hereafter, every proposition, then, consists of at least two names ; 

 brings together two names, in a particular manner. This is already a 

 first step towards what we are in quest of. It appears from this, that 

 for an act of belief, one object is not sufficient; the simplest act of be- 

 lief supposes, and has something to do with, two objects : two names, 

 to say the least ; and (since the names must be names of something) 

 two namcable things. A large class of thinkers would cut the matter 

 short by saying, two ideas. They would say, that the subject and 

 predicate are both of them names of ideas ; the idea of gold, for in- 

 stance, and the idea of yellow ; and that what takes place (or a part 

 of what takes place) in the act of belief, consists in bringing (as it is 

 often expressed) one of these ideas under the other. But this we are 

 not yet in a condition to say : whether such be the coiTect mode of 

 describing the phenomenon, is an after consideration. The result 

 with which for the present we must be contented, is, that in every act 

 of belief two objects are in some manner taken cognizance of; that 

 there can be no belief claimed, or question propounded, which does 

 not embrace two distinct (either material or intellectual) subjects of 

 thought : each of them capable or not of being conceived by itseH", but 

 incapable of being believed by itself. 



I may say, for instance, " the sun." The word has a meaning, and 

 suggests that meaning to the mind of any one who is listening to me. 

 But suppose I ask him, Whether it is true : whether he believes it ? 

 He can give no answer. There is as yet nothing to believe, or to dis- 

 believe. Now, however, let me make, of all possible assertions respect- 

 ing the sun, the one which involves the least of reference to any object 

 besides itself; let me say, " the sun exists." Here, at once, is some- 

 thing which a person can say he believes. But here, instead of only 

 one, we find two distinct objects of conception : the sun, is one object; 

 existence, is another. Let it not be said, that this second conception, 

 existence, is involved in the first ; for the sun may be conceived as no 

 longer existing, " The sun" does not convey all the meaning that is 

 conveyed by "the sun exists:" "my father" does not include all the 

 meaning of " my father exists," for he may be dead ; " a round square" 

 does not include the meaning of " a round square exists," for it does 

 not, and cannot exist. When I say, "the sun," "my father," or a 

 " round square," I call upon the hearer for no belief or disbelief, nor 

 can either the one or the other be affiarded me ; but if I say, " the sun 

 exists," " my father exists," or " a rovmd square exists," I call for be- 

 lief; and should, in the first of the three instances i^ect with it ; hi the 

 second, with belief or disbelief, as the case might be ; in the third, 

 with disbelief. 



§ 3. This first step in the analysis of the object of belief, which, 

 though so obvious, will be found to be not unimportant, is the only one 

 which we shall find it practicable to make without a preliminary sur- 

 vey of language. If we attempt to proceed further in the same path. 



