18 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



A genei'al name is familiarly defined, a name which is capable of 

 being truly affirmed, in the same sensfe, of each of an indefinite number 

 of things. An individual or singular naine is a name which is only ca- 

 pable of being truly affinned, in the same sense, of one thing. 



Thus, man is capable of being truly affirmed of John, Peter, George, 

 and other persons without assignable limits : and it is affirmed of all of 

 them in the same sense ; for the word man expresses certain qualities, 

 and when we predicate it of those persons, we assert that they all 

 possess those cj^ualities. But Jo7m. is only capable of being truly af- 

 , firmed of one single persen, at least in the same sense. For although 

 there are many persons who bear that name, it is not confeiTed ujjon 

 them to indicate any qualities, or anything which belongs to them in 

 common ; and cannot be said to be affinned of them in any sense at all, 

 consequently not in the same sense. ",The present king of England" 

 is also an individual name. For, that there never can he more than 

 one person at a time of whom it can be truly affirmed, is implied in 

 the meaning of the words. 



It is not unusual, by way of explaining what is meant by a general 

 name, to say that it is the name of a class. But this, though a conve- 

 nieilt mode of expression for some purposes, is objectionable as a defi- 

 nition, since it explains tlifi clearer of two things by the more obscure. 

 It would be more logical to reverse the proposition, and turn it into a 

 definition of the word class: "A class is the indefinite multitude of in- 

 dividuals denoted by a general name." 



It is necessary to distinguish general from collective names. A gen- 

 eral name is one which can be predicated of cacli individual of a mul- 

 titude ; . a collective name cannot be predicated of each separately, but 

 only of all taken together. " The 76th regiment of foot," winch is a 

 collective name, is not a general bvit an individual name ; for although 

 it can be predicated of a multitude of individual soldiers taken jointly, 

 it cannot be predicated of them severally. We may say, Jones is a 

 soldier, and Thompson is a soldier, and Smith is a soldier, but we can- 

 not say, Jones is the 76th regiment, and Thompson is the 76th regi- 

 ment, aixl Sn;iith is the 76th regiment. We can only say, Jones, 

 and Thompson,^ and Staith, and Brown, and so forth, (enumerating all 

 the sol^liers,) Hre the 76th regiment. 



*' The 76th regiment" is a collective name, but not a general one : 

 "a regimen,t" is both a collective and a general name. General with 

 respect to all individual regiments, of each of which separately it can 

 oe affirmed \ collective with respect to the individual soldiers, -of whom 

 any regiment is composed. . ' ' . > 



§ 4. The second general division of names is into concrete and ah- 

 stract. A concrete name is a name which stands for a thing ; an ab- 

 stract name is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing. Thus, 

 Jolm, the sea; this table, are ijames of things. White, also, is a name 

 of a thing, or rather of things. AVliiteness, agdn, is the name of a 

 quality or atti'ibute of those things. Man is a name of many things ; 

 humanity is a name of an attribute of those things. Old is a name of 

 things ; old age is a name of otie of their attributes. 



I have used the words concrete and abstract in the sense annexed to 

 them by the schoolmen, who, notwiths=tanding the impci-fections of their 

 philosophy, were unrivalled in the construction of technical language. 



