NAMES. 19 



and wHose clofinitions/ in logic at least, thongli tlioy never went more 

 than a little way into the subject, have seldom, I think, been altered 

 but to be spoiled. A practice, however, lias gi'own up in more mod- 

 em times, which, if not introduced by Locke, has gained cun-ency 

 chiefly from his example, of applying the expression " abstract name" 

 to all names which are the result of abstraction or generalization, and 

 consequently to all general names, instead of contining it to the names 

 of atti'ibutes. The metaphysicians of the Condillac school — Whose ad- 

 miration of Locke, passing over the profoundest speculations of that 

 ti'uly original genius, usually fastens with peculiar eagerness upon his 

 weakest points — ^liave gone on imitating him in this abuse oflanguage, 

 until there is now some difficulty in restoring the word to its original 

 signification. A more wanton alteration in the meaning of a word is 

 rarely to be met with ; for the exprcssioir general nanie, the exact 

 equivalent of which exists in all languages I am acquainted with, was 

 already available for the purpose to which abstract has .ibeen misap- 

 propriated, while the misappropriation leaves that important class of 

 words, the names of attributes, without any compact distinctive appel- 

 lation. The old acceptation, however, has nt3t gone so completely out 

 of use, as to deprive those who still adhere to it of all chance of being 

 miderstood. By abstract, then, I shall always mean the opposite of 

 concrete : by an abstract name, the name of an attribute ; by a con- 

 crete name, the name of an object. 



Do abstract names belong to the class of general, or to that of sin- 

 gular names ? Some of them are certainly general. I mean those 

 which are names not of one single and definite attribute, but of ^ class 

 of attributes. Such is the word color, which is a name common to 

 whiteness, redness, &c. Such is even the word whiteness, in respect 

 of the different shades of whiteness to which it is applied in common ; 

 the word magnitude, in respect of the various degrees of magnitude 

 and the various dimensions of space ; the word weight, in xespect of 

 the various degrees of weight. Such also is the word attribute itself, 

 the common name of all particular attributes. But when only one at- 

 tribute, neither variable in degree nor in kind, is designated b.Y the 

 name; as. visibleness ; tangibleness ; equality; squareness; milkwhite- 

 ness ; then the name can hardly be considered general ; for though it 

 denotes an attribute of many different objects, the attribute itself is al- 

 ways conceived as one, not many. The question is, however, of no 

 moment, and perhaps the best way of deciding it would be to consider 

 these names as neither general nor individual, but to place them in a 

 class ajrart. 



It may be objected to our definition of an abstract name^ that not 

 only the names which we have called abstract, biit adjectives, which 

 We have placed in the concrete class, are names of attribut<!s ; that 

 white, for example, is as, much the name of the color, as whiteness is. 

 But (as before remarked) a word ought to bo considered as the name 

 of that which we intend to be understood by it when we put it to its 

 principal use, that is, when we employ it in predication. Wlien we 

 say, snow is white, milk is white, linen is white, v^e do not mean it to 

 be understood that snow, or linen, or milk, is a color. We mean that 

 they are things having the color. The reverse is the '<:ase with the 

 word whiteness ; what wo affirra to be wliiteness is not snow but the 

 color of snow. Whiteness, therefore, is the name of the color exclu- 



