20 NAME3 AND PROPOSITIONS. 



sively : white is a name of all things, whatever having the color ; a name 

 not of the quality whiteness, but of, every white object. It is true, this 

 name w^as given to all those various objects on account of the quality ; and 

 we may therefore say, without impropriety, that the quality forms part 

 of its signification ; but a name can only be said to stand for, or to be a 

 name of, the things of which it can be predicated. We shall presently 

 see that all names which can be said to have any signification, all 

 names by applying which to an individual we give any information 

 respecting that individual, may be said to imply an attribute of some 

 sort ; but they are not names of the attribute ; it has its own proper 

 abstract name. 



§ 5. This leads us to the consideration of the third great division 

 of names, into connotative and ?ion.-connotativc, the latter sometimes, 

 but improperly, called absolute. This is one of the most important 

 distinctions which we shall have occasion to point out, and one of 

 those which go deepest into the nature of language, 



A non-connotative term is one which signifies a subject only, or an 

 attribute only, A connotative tei-m is one which denotes a subject 

 and implies an atti-ibute. By a subject is liere meant anything which 

 possesses attributes. Thus John, or London, or England, are names 

 which signify a subject only. Whiteness, length, virtue, signify an 

 attribute only. None of these names, therefore, are connotative. But 

 white, long, virtuous, are connotative. The word white, denotes all 

 Avhite things, as snow, paper, the foam of the sea, &c., and implies, or 

 as it was termed by the schoolmen, connotes* the attribute whiteness. 

 The w^ord white is not predicated of the attribute, but of the subjects, 

 snow, &:c. ; but when we predicate it of them we imply, or connote, 

 that the attribute whiteness belongs to them. The same may be said 

 of the other words above cited. Virtuous, for example, is the name 

 of a class, which includes Socrates, Howard, the man of Ross, and an 

 undefined number of other individuals, past, present, and to come. 

 These individuals, collectively and severally, can alone be said, with 

 propriety to be denoted by the word : of them alone can it properly 

 be said to be a name. But it is a name applied to all of them in con- 

 sequence of an attribute which they possess in common, the attribute 

 which men have agreed to call virtue. It is applied to all beings that 

 are considered to possess this attribute; and, to none whicli are not so 

 considered. 



All concrete general names are connotative. The word man, for 

 example, denotes Peter, Paul, John, and an indefinite number of other 

 individuals, of whom, taken as a class, it is the name. But it is 

 applied to them, because they possess, and to signify that they possess, 

 certain attributes. These seem to be, coi-poreity, animal life, ration- 

 ality, and a certain external fonn, which for distinction we call the 

 human. Every existing thing, which possessed all these attiibutes, 

 would be called a rnan ; and anything which possessed none of them, 

 or only one, or two, or even three of them without the fourth, would 

 not be so called.. Eor example, if in the interior of Africa there were 

 to be discovered a race of animals possessing reason equal to that of hu- 

 man beings, but with the form of an elephant, they would not be called 



* Notare, to mark ; co7motare, to mark along with : to mark one thing uith or m addition 

 to another. 



