22 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



be applied. Proper names are attached to the objects themselves, and 

 are not dependent upon the continuance of any attiibute of the object. 

 But there is another kind of names, which, although they are 

 individual names, that is, predicable only of one object, are really 

 connotative. For, although we may give to an individual a name 

 utterly .unmeaning, which we call a proper name, — a word which 

 answers the purpose of showing what thing it is we are talking about, 

 but not of telling anything about it ; yet a name peculiar to an 

 individual is not necessarily of this description. It may be significant 

 of some attribute, or some union of attributes, which being possessed by 

 no object but one, deteiTnines the name exclusively to that individual. 

 " The sun " is a name of this desci'iption ; " God," when used by -a 

 Christian, is another. These, however, are scarcely examples of what 

 we are now attempting to illustrate, being, in strictness, of language, 

 general, and not individual names : for, however they may be in fact 

 predicable only of one object, there is nothing in the meaning of the 

 words themselves which implies this : and, accordingly, when we ai'e 

 imagining and .not affirming, we may speak of many suns j and the 

 majority of mankind have believed, and still believe, that there are 

 many gods. But it is easy to produce words which are real instances 

 of connotative individual names. It may be part of the meaning of 

 the connotative name itself, that there exists but one individual possess- 

 ing the attribute which it connotes; as, for instance, "the onlij son of 

 John Stiles;" " the Jirst emperor of Rome." Or the attribute con- 

 noted may be a connexion with some determinate event, and the 

 connexion may be of such a kind as only one individual could have ; 

 or may at least be such as only one individual actually had ; and this 

 may be implied in the form of (the expression. "The father of 

 Socrates," is an example of the one kind (since Socrates could not 

 have had two fathers); "the author of the Iliad," "the murderer of 

 Henri Quatre," of the second. For, although it is conceivable that 

 more persons than one might have participated in the authorship of the 

 Iliad, or in the murder of Henri Quatre, the employment of the article 

 t7(,e implies that, in fact, this was not the case. What is here done by 

 the vvord the, is done in other cases by the context : thus, " Caesar's 

 army " is an individual name, if it appears from the context, that the 

 army meant is that which Caesar commanded in a particular battle. 

 The still more general expressions, " the Roman anny," or "the 

 Christian army," may be individualized in a similar manner. Another 

 case of frequent occurrence has alrfeady been noticed ; it is the follow- 

 ing. The name, being a many-worded one, may consist, in the first 

 place, of a general name, capable therefore in itself of being affirmed 

 of more things than one, but which is, in the second j^jlace, so limited 

 by other words joined with it, that the entire expression can only be 

 predicated of one object, consistently with the meaning of the general 

 term. This is exemplified in such an instance as the following : *' the 

 present prime minister of England." Prime Minister of England is a 

 general name ; the attributes which it connotes may be possessed by 

 an indefinite number of persons : in succession however, not simulta- 

 neously ; since the meaning of the word itself imports (among other 

 things) that there can be only one such person at a time. This being 

 the case, and the application of the name being afterwards limited by 

 the word present, to such individuals as possess the attributes at one 



