?4 N-AMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



which the attribute clothes all objects which are recognized as possess- 

 ing it. They ai-e not mere marks, but more, that is to say, significant 

 marks ; and the connotation is what constitutes their significance. 



As a proper name is said to be the name of the one individual 

 which it is predicated of, so (as well fi'om the importance of adhering 

 to analogy, as for the other reasons fonnerly assigned) a connotative 

 name ought to be considered a name of all the various individuals 

 which it is predicable of, or in other words denotes, and not^of what it 

 connotes. But by learning what things it is a na,me of, we do not 

 learn the meaning of the najne : for to the sande thing we may, wth 

 equal propriety, apply many names, not equivalent in meaning. Thus, 

 I call a certain man by the name Sophtoniscus : I call him by another 

 name. The father of Socrates. Both these are names of the same 

 individual, but their meaning is altogether different ; they are applied 

 to that individual for two different purposes ; the one, merely to 

 distinguish him from other persons who are spoken of; the other, to 

 indicate a fact relating to him, the fact that Socrates was his son. I 

 frirther apply to him these other expressions : a man, a Greek, an 

 Athenian, a sculptor, an old man, an honest man, a brave man. All 

 these are names of Sophi-oniscus, not indeed of him alone, but of him 

 and each of an indefinite number of other human beings. Each of 

 these names is applied to Sophroniscus for a different reason, and by 

 each whoever understands its meaning is apprised of a distinct fact or 

 number of facts concerning him ; but those who knew nothing about 

 the names except that they were applicable to Sophroniscus, would 

 be altogether igiiorant of their meaning. It is even conceivable that 

 I might know every single individual of whom a given name could be 

 Avith truth affirmed, and yet could not be said to know the meaning of 

 the name. A child knows who are its brothers and sisters, long before 

 it has any definite conception of the nature of the facts which are 

 involved in the signification of those words. 



In some cases it is not easy to decide precisely how much a particular 

 word does or does not connote ; that is, we do not exactly know (the 

 case not having arisen) what degree of difference in the object would 

 occasion a difference in the name. Thus, it is clear that the word 

 Tnan, besides animal life and rationality, connotes also a certain ex- 

 ternal form ; but it would be impossible to say precisely what form ; 

 that is, to decide how gi-eat a deviation from the form ordinarily found 

 in the beings whom we are accustomed to call men, would suffice in a 

 newly-discovered race to make us refuse them the name of man. 

 Rationality, also, being a quality which admits of degrees, it has never 

 been settled what is the loAvest degree of that quality which would 

 entitle any creature to be considered a human being. In all such 

 cases, the meaning of the general name is so far unsettled, and vague ; 

 mankind have not come to any positive agi'eement about the Tnatter. 

 ^\^len we come to ti-eat of classification, we shall have occasion to 

 show under what conditions this vagueness may exist Avithout practical 

 inconvenience ; and cases will appear, in •which the ends of language 

 are better promoted by it than by complete precision ; in order that, 

 in natural history, for instance, individuals or species of no very 

 marked character may be ranged ^rith those more strongly character- 

 ized individuals or species to whicli, in. all their properties taken 

 together, they bear the nearest resemblance. 



