NAMES. 29 



to me to bo so in a somcMiat less degit;c. I conceive, rather, that it 

 is by exaniinhig into the signification of rehitive names, or in other 

 words, into the natm-c of the attribute which they connote, that a clear 

 insight may best be obtained into the nature of all attributes ,♦ of all 

 that is meant by an attribute. 



It is obvious, in fact, that if we take any two correlative names, j^- 

 tlicr and son, fi>r instance, although the objects <^enoted by the names are 

 different, they both, in a certain sense, connote the same thing. They 

 cannot, indeed; be said to connote the same attribute ; to be a fatlier 

 is not the same thing as to be a son. But when we call one^ man a 

 father, another his son, what we mean to affirm is a set of facts, v<^hich 

 are exactly the same in both cases. To predicate of A that he is the 

 father of B, and of B. that he is the son of A, is to assert one and the 

 same fact in ditfcrent words. The two propositions are exactly equiv- 

 alent : neither of them asserts more or asserts less than the otlier. The 

 paternity of A and the filiation of B are not two facts, but two mode^ 

 of expressing the same fact. That fact, when analyzed, consists of a 

 series of physical events or phenometia, in whicli both A and B are 

 parties concerned, and fi-om which they both derive names. What 

 those names really connote is this series of events : that is the meaning 

 and the whole meaning, which either of them is intended to convey. 

 The series of events may be said to constitute the relatioh ; the school- 

 men called it the foundation of the x^dX\oxy, fundamentum relationis. 



In this manner any fact, or series of facts, in which two different 

 objects are implicated, and which is therefore predicable of both of 

 them, may be either considered as constituting an attribute of the one, 

 or an attribute of the other. According as we consider it in the for- 

 mer or in the latter aspect, it is connoted by the one or the other of the 

 two con'elative names. Father connotes the fact, regarded as consti- 

 tuting an attribute of A : son connotes the same fact, as constituting an 

 attribute of B. It may evidently be regarded with equal propriety in 

 either hght. And all that appears necessary to account for the exist- 

 ence of relative names, is, that whenever there is a fact, in which two ' 

 individuals are alike concerned, an attribute gi'ounded on that fact may 

 be ascribed to either of these individuals. 



A name, therefore, is said to be- relative, when, over and above the 

 object which it denotes, it im.plies in its signification the existence of 

 another object, also derivdng a denomination from the same fact which 

 is thegi'ound of the first name. Or (to express the same meaning in 

 other words). a name is relative, when, being the name of one thing, 

 its signification eanaot be explained but by mentioning another. Or 

 we may state it thus : — when the name cannot be employed in dis- 

 course, so as to have a meaning, unless the name of some other thing 

 than what it is itself the name- of, be either expressed or understood. 

 We may take our choice among these definitions. Thoy are all, at 

 bottom, equivalent, being modes of variously expressing this one dis- 

 tinctive circumstance — that every other attribute of an object might, 

 without any contradiction, be conceived still to exist if all objects- be- 

 sides that one were annihilated ;* but those of its attributes whidi aj-e 

 expressed by relative names would on that supposition be swept away. 



* Or rather all objects, except itself and the percipient mind ; for, as we shall S' 

 after, to ascribe any attribute to an object necessarily implies a mind to perceive it 



see here- 



