30 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



§ S. Names liave been further distinguished into lodvocal and cpquiv- 

 ocal : these, however, are not two kinds of names, but two different 

 modes of employing names. A name is univocal, or appHed, imivo- 

 cally, with respect to all things of which it can be precicated in the 

 same sense; but it is Eequivocal, or applied gequivocally, as rfespects 

 those things of which it is predicated in different senses. It is scai'cely 

 necessary to giye instances of a fact so familiar as the double meaning 

 of a word. In reality, a§ has, been already observed, an aequivocal or 

 ambiguous word is not one name, but two names, accidentally coinci- 

 ding in, sound. File standing for an iron instrument, and Jile standing 

 for a line of soldiers, have no more title to be considered one word, 

 because ^vTitten alike, than grease and Greece have, because they are 

 pronounced alike. They are one sound, appropriated to form two dif- 

 ferent words. 



An intermediate case is that of a name used analogically or meta- 

 phorically ; that is, a name which is predicated of two things, not 

 univocally, or exactly in the same signification, bvit in significations 

 somewhat similar, and which being derived one fx-om the other, one of 

 them may be considered the jarimary, and the other a secondary .sig- 

 nification. As when we speak of a brilliant light, and a brilliant 

 achievement. The word is not applied in the same sense to the light 

 and to the achievement ; but having been applied to the light in its 

 original sense, that of brightness to the eye, it is transferred to the 

 achievement in a derivative signification, supposed to be somewhat 

 like the primitive one. The word, however, is just as properly two 

 names instead of one, in this case, as in that of the most perfect am- 

 biguity. And one of the commonest forms of fallacious reasoning 

 arising from ambiguity, is that of arguing fit'om a metaphorical expres- 

 sion as if it were literal ; that is, as if a word, when applied metaphor- 

 ically, were the same name as when taken in its original sense : which 

 will be seen more particularly in its place. 



CHAPTER III. 



OF THE THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



§ 1. Looking back now to the commeticement of our inquiry, let us 

 attempt to measure how far it has advanced.. Logic, we found- is the 

 Theory of Proof But proof supposes' something provable, Avhich must 

 be a Proposition or Assertion ; since nothing but a Proposition can be 

 tin object of belief, or therefore of proof. A Proposition is, discourse 

 which affinns or denies something of some other thing. This is one 

 step : there must, it seems, be two things concerned in every act of 

 belief But what are these Things % They can be no other than those 

 signified by the two names, which being joined together by a copula 

 constitute the Proposition. If, therefore, Ave knew what all Names 

 signify, we should know everything which is capable either of being 

 made a subject of affimiation or denial, or of being itself affinned or 

 denied of a subject. We have accordingly, in the preceding chapter, 

 reviewed the various kinds of Names, in oz'der to ascertain what is sig- 



