THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 37 



done oi" to be done by the sovei-eign and the subjects, to or in regai-d 

 to one another reciprocally I So with the words physician and patient, 

 leader and follower, master and servant. In many cases the words 

 also connote actions which would be done under certain contingencies 

 by persons other than those denoted : as the words mortgagor and 

 mortgagee, obligor and obligee, and many other words expressive of 

 legal relation, which connote what a court of justice would do to 

 enforce the legal obligation if not fuliilled. There arc also words 

 which connote actions previously done by persons other than those 

 denoted either by the name itself or by its correlative ; as the word 

 brother. From these instances, it may be seen how large a portion of 

 the connotation of names consists of actions. Now, what is an action ] 

 Not one thing, but a series of two things : the state of mind called a 

 volition, followed by an effect. The volition, or intention to produce 

 the effect, is oi^e thing ; the effect produced in consequence of the ' 

 intention is another thing ; the two together constitute the action. I 

 form the pui-pose of instantly moving my arm ; that is a state of my 

 mind ; my arm (not being tied nor paralytic) moves in obedience to my 

 purpose ; that is a physical fact, consequent upon a state of mind. 

 The intention, when followed by the fact, or, (if we prefer the expres- 

 sion,) the fact when preceded and caused by the intention, is called the 

 action of moving my arm. 



§ 6. Of the first leading division' of nameable things, viz., Feelings 

 or States of Consciousness, we began by recognizing three sub-divi- 

 sions : Sensations, Thoughts, and Emotions. The first two of these 

 we have illustrated at considerable length ; the third. Emotions, not 

 being perplexed by similar ambiguities, does, not require similar exem- 

 plification. And, finally, we have found it necessary to add to these 

 three a fourth species, commonly known by the name Volitions. With- 

 out seeking to prejudge the metaphysical question whether any mental 

 state or phenomenon can be found which is not included in one or 

 other of these four species, it appears to me that the amount of illus- 

 tration bestowed upon these may, so far as we are concerned, suffice 

 for the whole genus. We shall, thei-efore, proceed to the two remain- 

 ing classes of nameable things ; all things which are external to the 

 mind being considered as belonging either to the class of Substances 

 or to that of Attributes. 



II. Substances. 



Logicians have endeavored to define Substance and Attribute ; 

 but their definitions are not so much attempts to dratw a distinction 

 between the things themselves, as instructions what difference it is 

 customary to make in the grammatical structure of the sentence, 

 according as you are speaking of substances or of attributes. Such 

 deSnitions are rather lessons of English, or of Greek, Latin, or Ger- 

 man, than of mental philosophy. An attribute, say the schocjl logi- 

 cians, must be the attribute o/" something : color, for example, nmst be 

 the color of something ; goodness must be the goodness of something : 

 and if this something should cease to exist, or should cease to be con- 

 nected with the attribute, the existence of the attribute would be at 

 an end, A substance, oft the contrary, is self-existent ; in speaking 



