38 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



about it, we need not put o/" after its name. A stone is not the stone 

 of any thing ; the moon is not the moon of anything, but simply the moon. 

 Unless, indeed, the name which Ave choose to give to the substance 

 be a relative name ; if so, it must be followed either by oj", or by some 

 other particle, implying, as that preposition does, a reference to some- 

 thing else : but then the other characteristic peculiarity of an attribute 

 would fail ; the something might be destroyed, and the substance might 

 still subsist. Thus, a father must be the father of something, and so 

 far resembles an attribute, in being refen-ed to something besides him- 

 self: if there were no child, there would be no father : but this, when 

 we look into the matter, only means that we should not call him father. 

 The man called father might still exist, though the child were annihi- 

 lated ; and there would be no contradiction in supposing him to exist, 

 although the whole universe except himself were destroyed. But 

 destroy all white substances, and where would be the attribute Avhite- 

 ness ? Whiteness, without any white thing, is a contradiction in terms. 



This is the nearest approach to a solution of the difficulty, that will 

 be found in the common treatises on logic. It will scarcely be thought 

 to be a satisfactoiy one. If an attribute is distinguished from a sub- 

 stance by being the attribute of something, it seems highly necessary 

 to understand what is meant by of: a particle which needs explanation 

 too much itself to be placed in front of the explanation of anything 

 else. And as for the self-existence of substances, it is very true that a 

 substance may be conceived to exist without any other substance, but 

 so also may an attribute without any other atti'ibute : and we can ik) 

 more imagine a substance without attributes than we can imagine 

 attributes without a substance. 



Metaphysicians, however, have probed the question deeper, and given 

 an account of Substance considerably more satisfactory than this. Sub- 

 stances are usually distinguished as Bodies or Minds. Of each of these, 

 philosophers have at length provided us with a definition which seems 

 unexceptionable. 



§ 7. A Body, according to the received doctrine of modem metaphy- 

 sicians, may be defined, the external cause to which we ascribe our 

 sensations. When I see and touch a piece of gold, I am conscious of 

 a sensation of yellow color, and sensations of hardness and weight; 

 and by varying the mode of handling, I may add to these sensations 

 many others completely distinct from them. The sensations are all of 

 which I am directly conscious ; but I consider them as produced by 

 something not only existing independently of my will, but external to 

 my bodily organs and to my mind. This external something I call a 

 Body. 



It may be asked, how come we to ascribe our sensations to any 

 external cause % and is there sufficient ground for so ascribing them ? 

 It is known, that there are metaphysicians who have raised a contro- 

 versy on the point ; maintaining the paradox, that we are not Avarranted 

 in refen-ing our sensations to a cause, such as we understand by the 

 word Body, or to any cause whatever, unless, indeed, the First Cause. 

 Though we have no concern here with this controversy, nor with the 

 metaphysical niceties on which it turns, one of the best ways of showing 

 what is meant by Substance is, to consider what position it is necessary 

 to take up, in order to maintain its existence against opponents. 



