THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 41 



reason for believing that what wc call the sensible qualities of the ob- 

 ject are a type of anything inherent in itself, or bear any affinity to its 

 own nature. A cause does not, as such, resemble its effects ; an east 

 wind is not like the feeling of cold, nor is heat like the steam of boiling 

 ^vater : why then should matter resemble our sensations 1 Why should 

 the inmost nature of tire or water resemble the impressions made by 

 these objects upon our senses ]* And if not on the principle of resem- 

 blance, on what other principle can the manner in which objects affect 

 us through our senses afford us any insight into the inherent nature of 

 those objects? It may therefore safely be laid down as a truth both 

 obvious in itself, and admitted by all whom it is at present necessary 

 to take into consideration, that, of the outward world, we know and 

 can know absolutely nothing, except the sensations which we ex- 

 perience from it. Those, however, who still look upon Ontology as 

 a possible science, and think, not only that bodies have an essen- 

 tial constitution of their own, lying deeper than our perceptions, but 

 that this essence or nature is not altogether inaccessible to human in- 

 vestigation, cannot expect to find their refutation here. The question 

 depends upon the nature and laws of Intuitive Knowledge, and is not 

 within the province of logic. 



§ S. Body having now been defined the external cause, and (accord- 

 ing to the more reasonable opinion) the hidden external cause, to which 

 we refer our sensations ; it remains to frame a definition of Mind. 

 Nor, after the preceding observations, will this be difficult. For, as 

 our concepti(m of a body is that of an unknown exciting cause of 

 sensations, so our conception of a mind is that of an unknown recipient, 

 or percipient, of them ; and not of them alone, but of all our other 

 feelings. As body is the mysterious something which excites the 

 mind to feel, so mind is the myterious something which feels, and 



priori, qu' elles ne sont pas en elles-memes ce qu'ellcs sont par rapport a nous, puisque la presence 

 du sujet modifie necessairement leur action. Suppriinez tout siijet sentant, il est certain 

 que ces causes agiraient encore puisqu'elles contiriueraient d'exister ; mais elles agiraient 

 autrement ; elles seraient encore des qualites et des proprietes, mais qui ne resembleraient 

 a rien de ce que nous connaissons. Le feu ne manifesterait plus aucune des proprietes que 

 nous lui connaisons : que serait-il ' C'est ce que nous ne saurons jamais. C'est (Tailleurs 

 peut-itre un probleme qui ne r'epugne pas seulement a la nature de notre esprit, mais a I'essence 

 mirne des choses. Quand m6me en effet-on supprimcrait par la pens^e tous les sujetj sentants, 

 il faudrait encore admettre qye nul corps ne manifesterait ses proprietes autrement qu'en 

 relation avec un sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas ses proprietes ne seraient encore que relatives : 

 en sorte qu'il me parait fort raisonnable d'admettre que les proprietes dcterminees des corps 

 n'existent pas independamment d'un sujet quelconque, et que ciuand on demande si les pro- 

 prietes de la matiere sont telles que nous les percevons, il faudrait voir auparavant si elles 

 sont en tant que determinees, et dans quel sens il est vrai de dire qu'elles sont." — Cours 

 d'Histoire de la Philosophie Morale au I8me siecle, 8me le<;on. 



* An attempt, indeed, has been made by Ileid and others, to establish that, although some 

 of the properties we ascribe to objects exist only in our sensations, others exist in the things 

 themselves, being such as cannot possibly be copies of any impression upon the senses ; and 

 they ask, from what sensation our notions of extension and figure have been derived ? The 

 gauntlet thrown down by Reid was taken up by Brown, who, applying greater powers of 

 analysis than had previously been applied to the notions of extension and figure, showed 

 clearly what are the sensations from which those notions are derived, viz., sensations oi 

 touch, combined with sensations of a class previously too little adverted to by metaphysi- 

 cians, those which have their seat in our muscular frame. Whoever wishes to be more 

 particularly acquainted with this admirable specimen of metaphysical analysis may consult 

 the first volume of Brown's Lectures, or Mill's Analysis of the Mind. 



On this subject also, the authority of M. Cousin may be quoted in favor of conclusions re- 

 jected by some of the most eminent thinkers of the school to which he belongs. M. Cousin 

 recognizes, in opposition to Reid, the esseutial subjectivity of our conceptions of the primary 

 qualities of matter, as extension, solidity, &c., equally with those of color, heat, and the 

 remainder of what are called secondary qualities.— Cowrs, «t supra, 9ine leqon. 



F 



