THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 45 



Other, the effect of another; one person the master, servant, child, 

 parent, husband, wife, sovereign, subject, attorney, client, of another, and 

 so on "? 



Omitting, for the present, the case of Resemblance (a relation which 

 requires to be considered separately), there seems to bo one thing 

 common to all these cases, and only one; that in each of them there 

 exists or occurs, or has existed or occurred, some^ac^ or phenomenon, 

 into which the two things which arc said to be related to each other, 

 both enter as parties concerned. This fact, or phenomenon, is what 

 the Aristotelian logicians (^lled the fundamcntum relatjonis. Thus in 

 the relation of greater and less between two magnitudes, the funda- 

 mentum relationis is the fact that when one of the two magnitudes is 

 applied to the other, it more than covers it ; and cannot, by any new 

 arrangement of parts, be entirely brought within the boundaries of the 

 other object. In the relation of master and servant, X\\g fundamentum 

 relationis is the fact that the one has undertaken, or is compelled, to 

 perform certain senices for the benefit, and at the bidding, of the other. 

 In that of husband and wife, \S\q fundamentum relationis consists of the 

 facts that the parties are a man and a woman, that they have promised 

 certain things with certain foniialities, and are in consequence invested 

 by the law with certain rights, and subjected to certain duties. Exam- 

 ples might be indefinitely multiplied, but it is already obvious that 

 whenever two things are said to be related, there is some fact, or series 

 of facts, into which they both enter ; and that whenever any two things 

 are involved in some one fact, or series of facts, we may ascribe to those 

 two things a mutual relation grounded on the fact. Even if they have 

 nothing in common but what is common to all things, that they are 

 members of the universe, we call that a relation, and denominate them 

 fellow-creatures, fellow-beings, or fellow-denizens of the universe. But 

 in propoi'tion as the fact into which the two objects enter as parts is 

 of a more special and peculiar, or of a more complicated nature, so 

 also is the relation grounded upon it. And there areas many con- 

 ceivable relations as there are conceivable kinds of fact in which two 

 things can be jointly concerned. 



In the same manner, therefore, as a quality is an attribute gi'ounded 

 upon the fact that a certain sensation or sensations are produced in us 

 by the object, so an attribute gi'ounded upon some fact into which the 

 object enters jointly with another object, is a relation between it and 

 that other object. But the fact in tlie latter case consists of the very 

 same kind of elements as the fact in the former : namely, states of 

 consciousness. In the case last cited, for example, the relation of 

 husband and wife ; the fandamentum relationis consists entirely of 

 thoughts, emotions, sensations, and volitions (actual or contingent), 

 either of the parties themselves or of other parties concerned in the 

 same scries of transactions, as, for instance, the intentions which would 

 oe formed Ijy a judge in case a complaint were made to his tribunal 

 of the infi-ingement of any of the legal obligations imposed by marriage; 

 and the acts which the judge would perform in consequence ; acts 

 being (as we have already seen) another word for intentions followed 

 by an effect, and that effect (again) being but another word fOr sensa- 

 tions, or some other feelings, occasioned cither to oneself or to some- 

 body else. There is no part whatever of what the names expressive 

 of the relation imply, that is not resolvable into states of consciousness ; 



