46 NAMES AND PROPOSITIOXS. 



outward objects being, no doubt, supposed throughout as the causes 

 by which some of those states of consciousness are excited, and minds 

 as the subjects by which all of them are experienced, but neither the 

 external objects nor the minds making their existence known other- 

 wise than by the states of consciousness. 



Cases of relation are not always so complicated as that to which we 

 last alluded. The simplest of all cases of relation are those expressed 

 by the words antecedent and consequent, and by the word simultane- 

 ous. If we say, for instance, that dawn preceded sunrise, the fact in 

 which the two things, dawn and sunrise, wgre jointly concerned, con- 

 sisted only of the two things themselves : no third tiling entered into 

 the fact or phenomenon at all ; unless, indeed, we choose to call the 

 succession of the two objects a third thing; but their succession is not 

 something added to the things themselves ; it is something involved in 

 them. Dawn and sunrise announce themselves to our consciousness 

 by two successive sensations : our consciousness of the succession of 

 these sensations is not a third sensation or feeling added to them ; we 

 have not first the two feelings, and then a feeling of their succession. 

 To have two feelings at all, implies having them either successively, or 

 else simultaneously. Sensations, or other feelings, being given, suc- 

 cession and simultaneousness are the two conditions, to the alternative 

 of which they are subjected by the nature of our faculties ; and no one 

 has been able, or needs expect, to analyze the matter any fmther. 



§ 11. In a somewhat similar position are two other sorts of relation. 

 Likeness and Unlikeness. I have two sensations ; we will suppose 

 them to be simple ones ; two seUsEytions of Avhite, or one sensation of 

 white and another of black. I call the first two sensations li/ce ; the last 

 two unlike. ^Vliat is the fact or phenomenon constituting the funda- 

 mentum of this relation ] The two sensations first, and then what we 

 call a feeling of resemblance, or a feeling of want of resemblance. Let 

 us confine ourselves to the fonner case. Resemblance is evidently a feel- 

 ing ; a state of the consciousness of the observer. Wliether the feeling 

 of the resemblance of the two colors be a third state of consciousness, 

 which I have after having the two sensations of color, or whether (like 

 the feeling of their succession) it is involved in the sensations them- 

 selves, may be a matter of discussion. But in either ca.se, these feel- 

 ings of resemblance, and of its opposite, dissimilarity, are parts of our 

 nature ; and parts so far from being capable of analysis, that they are 

 pre-supposed in every attempt to analyze any of our other feelings. 

 Likeness and unlikeness, therefore, as well as antecedence, sequence, 

 and simultaneousness, must stand apart among relations, as things sui 

 generis. They are attributes grounded on facts, that is, on states of 

 consciousness, but on states which ai'e peculiar, unresolvable, and 

 inexplicable. 



But, although likeness or unlikeness cannot be resolved into any- 

 thing else, complex cases of likeness or unlikeness can be I'esolved into 

 simpler ones. AVlien we say of two things whidi consist of parts, that 

 they are like one another, the likeness of the whole does admit of analy- 

 sis; it is compounded of likenesses between the various parts respec- 

 tively. Of how vast a variety of resemblances of parts must that re- 

 semblance be composed, which induces us to say that a portrait, or a 

 landscape, is like its original. If one person mimics another with any 



