THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 17 



success, of how many simple likcucsst'S must the general or complex 

 likeness be compounded: likeness in ii suocessioji of bodily i)ostures; 

 likeness in voiee, or in the accents and intonations of the voice; like- 

 ness in the choice of Avoids, and in the thoughts or sentiments express- 

 ed, whether by word, countenance, or gesture. 



All likeness, and unlikeness of which wo have any cognizance, re- 

 solve themselves into likeness and unlikeness between states of our 

 own, or some other mind. AVlien we say that one body is like another, 

 (since we know nothing of bodies but the sensations which they ex- 

 cite,) we mi>an really that there is a resemblance between the sensa- 

 tions excited by the two bodies, or between some portion at least of 

 those sensations. If we say that two attributes are like one another, 

 (since we know nothing of attributes except the sensations or states of 

 feeling on which they are grounded,) we mean really tluiX those sensa- 

 tions, or states of feeling, resemble each other. We may also say that 

 two relations are alike. The fact of resemblance between relations is 

 sometimes called analogy, forming one of the numerous meanings of 

 that word. The relation in which Priam stood to Hector, namely, that 

 of father and son, resembles the relation in which Philip stood to Alex- 

 ander ; resembles it so closely that they are called the same relation. 

 The relation in which Cromwell stood to England resembles the rela- 

 tion in which Napoleon stood to Franco, thougli not so closely as to be 

 called the same relation. The meaning in both these instances must 

 be, that a resemblance existed between the facts which constituted the 

 fundament um relationis. 



This resemblance may exist in all conceivable gi-adations, from 

 perfect undistinguishableness to sometliing very slight indeed. When 

 we say, that a thought suggested to the mind of a person of genius is 

 like a seed cast into the gi-ound, because the former jiroduces a multi- 

 tude of other thoughts, and the latter a multitude of other seeds, this is 

 saying that between the relation of an inventive mind to a thought 

 contained in it, and the relation of a fertile soil to a seed contained in 

 it, there exists a resemblance : the real resemblance being in, the two 

 fundamcnta relationis, m each of which there occurs a germ, producing 

 by its development a multitude of other things similar to itself. And 

 as, whenever two objects are jointly concerned in a phenomenon, this 

 constitutes a relation between those objects ; so, if wo suppose a second 

 pair of objects concerned in a second phenomenon, the slightest resem- 

 blance between the two phenomena is sufficient to admit of its being 

 said that the two relations resemble ; provided, of coiu'se, the points 

 of resemblance are found in those portions of the two phenomena 

 respectively which are connoted by the relative names. 



While speaking of resemblance, it is necessary to take notice of an 

 ambiguity of language, against which scarcely any one is sufficiently 

 on his guard. Resemblance, when it exists in the highest degree of 

 all, amounting to undistinguishableness, is often called identity, and 

 the two similar things are said to be the same. I say often, not always ; 

 for we do not say that two visible objects, two persons for instance, 

 are the same, because they are so much alike that one might be mis- 

 taken for the other : but W£ constantly use this mode of expression 

 Avhen speaking of fijelings ; as when I say that the sight of any object 

 gives me the same sensation or emotion to-day that it did yesterday, or 

 the sa7ne wliich it gives to some other person. This is evidently an 



